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ABSTRACT 
 Preparedness agencies fail to act on gaps identified by exercises; instead, they 
repeat exercises and never move to resolve issues. After-action reports document exercise 
findings, but are not shared with forward-facing staff who do the work. Agencies spend 
federal money exercising capabilities, but fail to implement changes recommended by 
exercise evaluations. Yet some agencies are able to report successful after-action events 
and document improved capability performance. This thesis interviewed exercise 
professionals to identify common success factors and innovative solutions to after-action 
process challenges. It also surveyed preparedness employees to determine if after-action 
experiences differ by authority level. The thesis reviewed corporate change management 
literature looking for common steps to manage change and improve capabilities for 
emergency management agencies. The survey results show exercise participants 
experience after-action events differently based partly on their authority level. In 
particular, employees at an agency’s forefront are less likely to see policy changes or be 
given an opportunity to read after-action documents and improvement plans. The 
literature review indicates specific interventions that can alleviate this, and the interviews 
illustrate instances where changes have been successfully applied. The thesis finally 
recommends specific strategies to increase the success of improvement plans. 
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A. OPENING STATEMENT 
Preparedness agencies fail to act on gaps identified by exercises; instead, they 
repeat exercises and never move to resolve issues. After-action reports (AARs) document 
exercise findings, but are not shared with forward-facing staff who do the work. Agencies 
spend federal money exercising capabilities, but fail to implement changes recommended 
by exercise evaluations.  
Exercise professionals create after-action documents and improvement plans (IPs), 
and then assume their findings are communicated throughout the agency. Exercise 
participants do not learn about exercise-generated policy changes or IPs.  
Identifying gaps between the assumptions of exercise creators and the experiences 
of exercise participants is not new. Determining more precisely where this gap exists in 
terms of agency authority level is more helpful. However, identifying steps from corporate 
change management theories applicable to emergency management increases the 
likelihood exercise lessons will truly be learned, not just repeated.  
B. PURPOSE OF RESEARCH 
Preparedness agencies receive millions of dollars from the federal government. 
Exercise participation is meant to show national preparedness and the strength of core 
capabilities. However, if agencies do not follow through and improve the exercise’s 
findings, the return on investment is low. This thesis provides clear steps to improve after-
action outcomes and complete IP items.  
C. METHOD OF DATA GATHERING AND ANALYSIS 
Three research methods were employed to collect information for this thesis.  
A literature review of change management theory explored the ways for-profit  
corporations manage change in their fast-moving, high-consequence world. While  
the world of homeland security, emergency management, and government agencies is 
slower paced, they too reside in a high-consequence world. Investigating corporate change 
xvi 
management theory provided models for preparedness agencies to follow. Examples 
provided by several change management theorists offer guidance for ensuring changes and 
improvements begun are completed.  
To understand the extent of the problem, a survey asked preparedness exercise 
participants about their after-action experiences. Survey respondents were asked if they 
saw after-action documents or IPs. Respondents were also asked if they saw policy or 
training changes addressing gaps identified by exercises, or if they had personally changed 
any behaviors. Survey respondents were divided by agency authority level to examine if 
front-line employees and first-level managers experiences differed from upper-level 
management.  
Exercise professionals were interviewed to understand the after-action events  
from the exercise creator’s perspective. Interview subjects were asked about successful 
after-action events they experienced, agency processes, and communication of exercise 
findings. Common factors leading to successful after-action events were identified.  
The exercise professionals also spoke about innovative solutions to the remaining barriers 
that hinder IPs.  
D. OVERVIEW OF FINDINGS 
This thesis found similarities between corporate change management theories and 
FEMA’s Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) guidance for 
exercise management and improvement planning. HSEEP’s strength lies in its instructions 
for exercise planning and conduct, but its weakness is evident in exercise after-action 
events. Change management theory provides actionable steps to help HSEEP users move 
beyond just identification of issues and into solutions.  
Exercise participants experience after-action events differently based in part on 
their authority level. Employees at an agency’s forefront are less likely to see policy 
changes or be given an opportunity to read after-action documents and IPs. Front-line and 
first-level managers are the workers of an agency. Policy changes and IPs must be visible 
to these workers if an agency hopes to strengthen its capabilities.  
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Exercise professionals distribute after-action documentation to select subject matter 
experts or individual agency contacts rather than disseminating the findings widely. 
Exercise professionals had no data documenting whether their findings were conveyed 
within agencies or to other relevant stakeholders. 
E. RECOMMENDATIONS AND JUSTIFICATIONS 
A clear plan to manage information collection and organizational changes improves 
after-action event outcomes by increasing capabilities within a preparedness organization. 
These recommendations offer strategies to increase successful after-action events. 
1. Organizational Changes Must Be Clearly Identified to All Authority 
Levels 
Preparedness agencies update policies and training programs to address gaps 
identified by exercises and real-world events. However, policy changes and training roll-
outs must be communicated to all authority levels within an organization frequently and 
include why changes are occurring. Consistently communicating the importance of the 
organizational change signals to employees the value and seriousness with which the 
organization views the need for improvement.  
2. Organizations Must Include Employees of All Authority Levels in 
After-Action Events  
Preparedness agencies do not intend to silo employees and limit communication. 
However, if only management is privy to after-action discussions and improvement 
planning, front-line employees are left out. Including employees at all authority levels 
helps drive change. Employees with enthusiasm champion IP items they feel passionately 
about, regardless of their authority level.  
3. Leverage Leadership, Whole Community Support, and Trust for 
Successful After-Action Events 
Successful change management strategies encourage leaders to visibly drive 
change. Incorporating leadership influence helps increase successful completion of IP 
items. Interagency cooperation and community partnerships help by distributing work and 
xviii 
cost among many stakeholders when IP items are big or costly. Building trust plays an 
important role in both receiving honest feedback from exercise participants and working 
with leadership to approve honest documents for dissemination. 
4. Exercise Professionals Must Disseminate After-Action Documents to 
Wider Audiences 
Exercise professionals need to reach broader audiences with after-action action 
documents. Expanding distribution beyond single points of contact within agencies allows 
more exercise participants an opportunity to learn exercise findings.  
Barriers to successful after-action processes exist. Change management strategies 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
“Hey, Fred. You here for the exercise?” 
“Yeah, Trevor. You think they fixed the radios yet? At last year’s exercise, 
we couldn’t talk to the guys in the next county.” 
“I dunno. I think it was discussed during the after-action meeting last year, 
but I never heard anything from the supervisor after that. Did you?” 
“Nah, I never heard what happened. Betcha the radios still don’t work.” 
*** 
“Cassie, did you finish writing the after-action report from the full-scale?” 
“Yes, I finished a couple of months ago. It’s still with senior leadership, 
why?” 
“I’m going out to a meeting with some stakeholders who were involved in 
that big exercise. I wanted to report some of the findings.” 
“Jim, I’m not sure leadership wants those findings made public…” 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Too often, conversations like the one between Trevor and Fred or Cassie and Jim 
are heard at the exercise check-in table or around the office water cooler. Employees repeat 
preparedness exercises, but without feedback from previous exercises, lessons are 
identified, but not truly learned.1 Exercise professionals develop challenging scenarios, 
showcase participants’ skills, and document findings in reports that are shelved instead of 
read.2 The result is issues identified in previous exercises are not corrected, because the 
improvement plan (IP) never filtered down to all participants. Organizations identify 
needed changes, but the change process is not managed properly.3  
 
1 Amy K. Donahue and Robert V. Tuohy, “Lessons We Don’t Learn: A Study of the Lessons of 
Disasters, Why We Repeat Them, and How We Can Learn Them,” Homeland Security Affairs 2, no. 2 
(July 2006): 1–28. 
2 Thomas A. Birkland, “Disasters, Lessons Learned, and Fantasy Documents,” Journal of 





The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)’s Homeland Security 
Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) cycle has been proffered to preparedness 
stakeholders as the way to conduct and evaluate exercises.4 It involves agencies creating 
after-action reports (AAR) and IPs after exercises or incidents to address the gaps 
identified. Ideally, an agency works through the AAR/IP to increase its capabilities before 
the next exercise or real-world event. Despite having HSEEP templates and tools, not all 
agencies complete the exercise evaluation cycle and successfully manage the changes 
needed.  
Even FEMA struggles to manage change successfully. In 2011, the Department of 
Homeland Security Office of Inspector General (OIG) made recommendations in its report, 
FEMA’s Progress in Implementing the Remedial Action Management Program (OIG 11-
32) that FEMA needed to develop instructions for creating clear and concise lessons 
learned statements.5 The OIG also found FEMA’s program manager forwarded 
documented lessons learned to all 70 users enrolled in the program’s database. At the time 
however, FEMA had 7,000 employees at its headquarters, and another 9,000 disaster 
assistance employees in other locations.6 The OIG report quoted a regional FEMA official 
who said, “lessons learned and best practices must be distributed in a more effective 
manner.”7 
The value of preparedness exercises is in improved employee response and agency 
readiness for real-world incidents.8 Some organizations conduct successful after-action 
 
4 Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013), Intro–1, https://www.fema.gov/media-
library-data/20130726-1914-25045-8890/hseep_apr13_.pdf. 
5 Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, FEMA’s Progress in Implementing 
the Remedial Action Management Program, OIG-11-32 (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland 
Security, 2011), 1. 
6 Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, 7. 
7 Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, 7. 




events and manage changes while others do not.9 What factors affect the success of an 
after-action event? Is the after-action experience the same for all members of an 
organization? How do organizations communicate after-action findings and IPs? Do 
exercise findings reach frontline employees and first level managers? Why are some 
organizations more successful at after-action events than others? 
This thesis aims to address two main points: (1) establish if differences in after-
action experiences exists between authority levels within organizations, and (2) determine 
success factors for after-action processes and innovative solutions to some remaining 
challenges. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This study focuses on four primary research questions:  
• Do preparedness exercises result in visible policy, training, or behavior 
changes seen by front-line employees and first-level managers? 
• Do after-action event experiences of upper-level management differ from 
front-line employees and first-level managers? 
• In agencies with successful after-action events, what factors account for 
their success? 
• What innovative solutions can help overcome the remaining challenges 
hindering successful after-action processes? 
C. PURPOSE AND METHOD OF STUDY 
The purpose of this thesis was to determine if after-action events result in visible 
policy, training, or behavior changes. The thesis also aimed to identify after-action success 
factors and innovative solutions to challenges still faced.  
 
9 Elena Savoia, Foluso Agboola, and Paul D. Biddinger, “Use of After Action Reports (AARs) to 
Promote Organizational and Systems Learning in Emergency Preparedness,” International Journal of 




A literature review of change management theories was undertaken to determine if 
ideas from the corporate world could be applied to emergency management fields. 
A survey was used to collect data. Statistical analysis identified the changes visible 
to front-line staff and first-level managers following preparedness exercises. Analysis of 
survey data also differentiated experiences of upper-level management from employees to 
determine at what authority level after-action experiences might shift.  
Interviews were conducted with exercise professionals across the country to 
identify factors associated with successful after-action processes and innovative solutions 
to the challenges they still face. Interviews were coded for common themes. 
D. SCOPE AND CONTRIBUTION 
Due to the time constraints, limitations to this thesis include: (1) data collection 
limited to government employees, healthcare providers, first responders, and emergency 
management professionals, (2) a focus on after-action events, particularly the 
communication of after-action recommendations, and (3) interviews conducted with six 
exercise professions who identified conducting successful after-action events.  
Results of this thesis were presented to agency leadership; the researcher used 
conclusions drawn from the data to inform and improve future after-action events. The 
conclusions drawn from this research might also be useful to other preparedness exercise 
professionals looking to improve their agency’s after-action processes and outcomes.  
E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
Chapter II of this thesis contains background information and a brief overview of 
change management literature relevant to improving preparedness exercise after-action 
outcomes. Chapter III outlines the research design process and methodology used to 
measure and analyze data from the quantitative survey. Chapter III also outlines the coding 
process of the qualitative interviews. Chapter IV presents the quantitative survey results 
and extrapolates front-line staff and first-level managers’ experiences juxtaposed with 
upper-level managers’ experiences. Chapter V shares the qualitative interview analysis 
from the six, semi-structured interviews and highlights the commonalities and continuing 
 
5 
barriers experienced by the exercise professionals. Chapter VI discusses the change 
management literature, the quantitative survey results, and the qualitative interview data, 
and ties the three streams together. Chapter VII summarizes and draws conclusions from 
the original research data findings. This chapter also concludes with the thesis’s limitations 
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II. BACKGROUND OF HSEEP AND  
CHANGE MANAGEMENT IMPERATIVES 
The purpose of this chapter is threefold: (1) to examine the genesis of the 
Department of Homeland Security’s AAR/IP, (2) to identify concerns with relying solely 
on the current HSEEP, and (3) to examine some leading theories in corporate change 
management to see how they can apply to emergency management.  
A. THE GENESIS OF HSEEP’S AFTER-ACTION REPORT  
In the early 2000s, Homeland Security Presidential Directives 5, 7, and 8 helped 
create capabilities-based exercise initiatives in accordance with the National Response 
Plan.10 These initiatives were the beginning of HSEEP. In the Purpose section of the 2013 
HSEEP update, the document states that only through improvement planning can 
organizations correct gaps to “improve plans, build and sustain capabilities, and maintain 
readiness.”11 The introduction to the HSEEP document further explains the purpose of 
preparedness exercises:  
Exercise evaluation assesses the ability to meet exercise objectives and 
capabilities by documenting strengths, areas for improvement, core 
capability performance, and corrective actions in an After-Action 
Report/Improvement Plan (AAR/IP). Through improvement planning, 
organizations take the corrective actions needed to improve plans, build and 
sustain capabilities, and maintain readiness.12  
HSEEP recommends creating an AAR following all exercises and real-world 
events. HSEEP was a modification of the United States’ Army’s after-action review, an 
oral tradition of recapping events, confusingly also abbreviated “AAR.”  
 
10 “Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5,” Department of Homeland Security, February 28, 
2003, https://www.dhs.gov/publication/homeland-security-presidential-directive-5; “Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 7,” Department of Homeland Security, June 27, 2008, 
https://www.dhs.gov/homeland-security-presidential-directive-7; “Presidential Policy Directive 8: National 
Preparedness,” Department of Homeland Security, July 7, 2008, https://www.dhs.gov/presidential-policy-
directive-8-national-preparedness. 
11 Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP), 
Intro–1. 
12 Department of Homeland Security, Intro–1. 
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In 1999, John Morrison and Larry Meliza researched the beginnings of the 
U.S. Army’s use of after-action reviews for their still-referenced report, Foundations of the 
After-Action Review Process.13 This comprehensive report for the U.S. Army Research 
Institute traces the beginnings of after-action reviews to conversations held in the field 
between official Army historian S. L. A. Marshall and U.S. Army troops during the Second 
World War. Marshall’s troop interviews comprised the oral histories of the battles the men 
fought, lessons they learned, and methods to improve in the future.14  
Morrison and Meliza quote the U.S. Army’s Training Circular 25-20, which defines 
an after-action review as “a professional discussion of an event, focused on performance 
standards, that enables soldiers to discover for themselves what happened, why it 
happened, and how to sustain strengths and improve weaknesses.”15 Two important ideas 
are encapsulated in this definition. First, after-action review is a discussion rather than a 
formal, written document, and second, the review allows the participants to learn for 
themselves rather than be told the results of the event.  
Other scholars define an after-action review slightly differently, but the focus 
remains on participants reviewing their own performance. For example, Thomas Mastagilo 
et al. describe a review as a “retrospective session that allows trainees to review prior 
training performance . . . conducted to focus on what was planned to occur during training, 
what actually did occur during training, why events unfolded as they did, and what should 
be modified during subsequent training.”16 A consistent theme that review is essential for 
improvement is seen throughout the definitions. James Bliss writes that an after-action 
review should focus on using experiences to promote learning.17 In her research report for 
 
13 John E. Morrison and Larry L. Meliza, Foundations of the After-action Review Process (Adelphi, 
MD: United States Army Research Institute, 1999), v–vi. 
14 Morrison and Meliza, 5. 
15 Morrison and Meliza, 1. 
16 Thomas Mastaglio et al., Current Practice and Theoretical Foundations for the After Action Review 
(Alexandria, VA: United States Army Research Institute, 2010), 1. 
17 Bliss et al., Establishing an Intellectual and Theoretical Foundation for the After Action Review 
Process—A Literature Review (Adelphi, MD: United States Army Research Institute, 2011), v.  
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the U.S. Army Research Institute, Margaret Salter writes that after-action reviews should 
ask questions, encourage thinking, and get participants talking.18  
However, an after-action review is more than just people talking to one another 
about a recent event. After-action reviews are facilitated discussions. An after-action 
review requires someone outside of the event being discussed to keep participants focused 
on the exercise’s intended outcomes and actual events.19 After-action researchers note if 
the event facilitator, often called the observer/controller (O/C) in military reports, is not 
well trained, participant learning can be hindered.20 Then, the review may lose focus and 
turn into a critique or lecture.21  
After-action reviews are considered the “gold standard” for improving learning 
outcomes and researchers argue they are one of the best ways organizations learn.22 The 
Army’s success with after-action reviews has been understood outside the military for 
years. Much has been written about their use by major corporations and their interpretation 
of the process.23 Perhaps the first private industry known for incorporating the U. S. 
Army’s after-action review process was Shell Oil, in 1994, when a retired general sat on 
their board of directors.24 Corporations like Harley-Davidson use a modified version of the 
U.S. Army’s after-action review to ensure standards are met before a product launch.25 
Other companies, like wine retailer and distributor Geerlings & Wade, conduct quarterly 
after-action reviews to look consistently at what went well and what did not.26 
 
18 Margaret S. Salter and Gerald E. Klein, After Action Reviews: Current Observations and 
Recommendations (Alexandria, VA: United States Army Research Institute, 2007). 
19 Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP), 
4–3. 
20 Mastaglio et al., Current Practice and Theoretical Foundations, 2. 
21 Salter and Klein, After Action Reviews, 9. 
22 Mastaglio et al., Current Practice and Theoretical Foundations, 2. 
23 Marilyn Darling and Charles S. Parry, “After Action Reviews: Linking Reflection and Planning in a 
Learning Practice,” Reflections 3, no. 2 (2001): 68.  
24 Darling and Parry, 68. 
25 Darling and Parry, 68. 
26 Darling and Parry, 68. 
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Like the private sector, when FEMA looked to codify the exercise and evaluation 
cycle, they included a form of after-the-action recap to allow for data collection, evaluation, 
interpretation, and making recommendations.27 The most recent, 2013 version of HSEEP 
continues to recommend a process for exercise evaluation that begins with a player hotwash 
immediately after the exercise concludes.28  
HSEEP’s hotwash mimics the U.S. Army’s after-action review.29 HSEEP defines 
a hotwash as “a facilitated discussion held immediately after an exercise among exercise 
players. It captures feedback about any issues, concerns, or proposed improvements players 
may have about the exercise. [It] is an opportunity for players to voice their opinions on 
the exercise and their own performance.”30 The hotwash, led by a facilitator, captures the 
exercise participant’s verbal recollections immediately after the exercise ends.  
HSEEP’s exercise evaluation does not stop after the initial hotwash discussion. 
Instead, it continues with collecting evaluation data to produce a written document, the 
after-action report (AAR). HSEEP’s AAR encapsulates the exercise’s planned objectives, 
core capabilities, and evaluator findings.31 An exercise professional, often the exercise 
director or exercise planning team, usually writes this report. The draft report is then 
briefed to elected or appointed officials, leadership from the organizations involved with 
the exercise, lead evaluators, and the exercise planning team to allow everyone a chance to 
weigh in on the findings and recommendations.32  
B. PROBLEMS WITH HSEEP  
HSEEP has adapted since its inception, but some fundamental problems still exist 
with the program. Exercise professionals and scholars have concerns about HSEEP’s “ad 
 
27 Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP), 
4–7. 
28 Department of Homeland Security, 4–7. 
29 Mastaglio et al., Current Practice and Theoretical Foundations, 1.  
30 Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program, 67. 
31 Department of Homeland Security, Glossary–1. 
32 Department of Homeland Security, Glossary–1. 
 
11 
hoc” process for reporting after-action events.33 Three specific concerns are: (1) HSEEP’s 
lack of guidance for writing AAR/IPs, (2) HSEEP’s lack of guidance for tracking or 
implementing the IP, and (3) a lack of guidance for communicating exercise findings to 
others. 
The essence of HSEEP is a doctrine for exercise creation and evaluation.34 
However, scholars have noted no specific guidance exists for evaluating the performance 
of capabilities.35 Reading the most recent 2013 version of the HSEEP manual highlights 
some alarming observations in terms of the emphasis, or rather the lack of emphasis, in 
exercise evaluation. The document devotes nearly 50 pages to exercise creation, yet only 
about half a page discusses data analysis, and three paragraphs provide information about 
writing AARs.36 Including the information about the IP only adds just over two pages. 
Altogether, data analysis, AARs, and IPs account for less than 10 percent of the HSEEP 
document.37  
Researchers have noted that with HSEEP’s limited guidance, the manner in which 
AARs are created is not universal; instead, reports are created ad hoc.38 FEMA claims in 
its HSEEP document, exercises provide an opportunity for the whole community to come 
together and work to prevent, protect, mitigate, respond, and recover from any incident.39 
However, exercises can only do those things if participants learn from them. Without clear 
guidance on how to analyze data generated by the exercise or write an AAR/IP, agencies 
 
33 Donahue and Tuohy, “Lessons We Don’t Learn,” 12. 
34 Adam Norige et al., “Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program—Enterprise Platform 
(HSEEP-EP): An Innovative Service Oriented Architecture Approach,” in 2012 IEEE Conference on 
Technologies for Homeland Security (HST), 123–28, 2012, https://doi.org/10.1109/THS.2012.6459836. 
35 Brandon Greenberg, Paule Voevodsky, and Erica Gralla, “A Capabilities-Based Framework for 
Disaster Response Exercise Design and Evaluation: Findings from Oil Spill Response Exercises,” Journal 
of Homeland Security and Emergency Management 13, no. 4 (2016): 2, https://doi.org/10.1515/jhsem-
2016-0034. 
36 Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP), 
5–5—5–6. 
37 Department of Homeland Security, 5–5—5–6, 6–1—6–3. 
38 Donahue and Tuohy, “Lessons We Don’t Learn,” 12. 




struggle to show lessons were learned. Donahue and Tuohy feel the phrase “lessons 
learned” is inaccurate. They write lessons are not really learned, as evidenced by the same 
mistakes being repeated in later exercises.40  
In the 2013 HSEEP document, six fundamental principles are listed. Exercise 
practitioners are encouraged to apply the Fundamental Principles to help manage exercise 
programs and individual exercises.41 The fundamental principles are:  
• Guided by elected and appointed officials 
• Capability-based, objective driven 
• Progressive planning approach 
• Whole community integration 
• Informed by risk 
• Common methodology42  
Nowhere in the fundamental principle list does it mention how to learn from, analyze, or 
document findings from an exercise program. 
In 2011, FEMA and the Department of Homeland Security, Science and 
Technology Directorate (DHS S&T) worked with the Lincoln Laboratory at MIT to update 
HSEEP to be a more flexible method for actually tracking capabilities. A platform called 
the HSEEP enterprise platform (HSEEP-EP) was envisioned to be “a highly flexible 
framework that will form the foundation of the new HSEEP Toolkit.”43 
Researchers working on the HSEEP-EP framework looked into four parts of the 
then-current HSEEP Toolkit and noted “significant capability gaps” throughout, but 
 
40 Donahue and Tuohy, “Lessons We Don’t Learn,” 3. 
41 Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP), 
1–1. 
42 Department of Homeland Security, 1–1. 




especially in terms of the evaluation piece.44 Norige et al. noted, “currently, exercise 
evaluators often stress the need for evaluation tools, specific to the HSEEP process, which 
can assist them with their exercise evaluations. In place of an integrated set of evaluation 
tools, capable exercise evaluators build ad-hoc tools to suit their immediate evaluation 
needs.”45 The article’s authors hoped this HSEEP-EP would provide an efficient way to 
consult a variety of exercise data sources and provide an easy way to share information 
between organizations and agencies. The promises of the HSEEP-EP platform were 
interesting, but nearly a decade later, it has not been produced. 
While exercise professionals wait, FEMA’s current version of the HSEEP cycle 
uses after-action reporting and documenting as a way to capture lessons learned in the 
exercise. FEMA originally hoped that lessons learned from exercises or events in one 
jurisdiction would help other agencies or jurisdictions.46 To facilitate the sharing of 
knowledge, FEMA created the Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS) program so 
that jurisdictions might not repeat mistakes others had already made. Several authors have 
pointed out flaws with this idea, though. Darling and Parry summarize the situation 
succinctly: “What faith would you place in the report of someone whom you don’t know, 
based on a one-time experience?”47  
Not surprisingly, agencies did not want to air their dirty laundry in a national 
database for all to see. Agencies do not want to admit their mistakes or leave themselves 
open to lawsuits by admitting errors.48 The library of after-action documents also fell short 
of its intended purpose because it can be difficult to apply lessons from one disaster to 
another one experienced by a different agency, at a different time, in a different location. 
 
44 Norige et al., 124. 
45 Norige et al., 127. 
46 Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, FEMA’s Progress in Implementing 
the Remedial Action Management Program, 1. 
47 Darling and Parry, “Linking Reflection and Planning,” 65. 
48 Birkland, “Disasters, Lessons Learned, and Fantasy Documents,” 149. 
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Events are unique, and agencies, like people, often need to make mistakes themselves to 
learn from them.49 
In early 2015, the LLIS ceased to exist as a separate repository and most content 
was moved to the Homeland Security Digital Library (HSDL).50 At that time, 
approximately 23,000 sources were moved into the HSDL.51 However, the LLIS had been 
online since 2004, which means on average, less than 2,100 lessons learned documents 
were uploaded annually. Also, if the LLIS gathered lessons learned and best practices from 
a cadre of more than 18,000 public safety officials and national subject matter experts 
(SMEs) as they claimed, the small number of submissions demonstrate a lack of use of the 
LLIS.52  
Researchers Donahue and Tuohy reported “incident commanders who participated 
in our study pointed out that discussions of lessons are moot unless they can be 
disseminated to the grass-roots level …[so] line responders can adopt them.”53  
When lessons are not disseminated, they become “observed,” rather than learned.54  
As researchers Elena Savoia, Foluso Agboola, and Paul Biddinger noted in their article, 
“Use of After Action Reports (AARs) to Promote Organizational and Systems Learning in 
Emergency Preparedness,” “despite voluminous attempts to document and learn from prior 
emergency preparedness system response failures, the challenges experienced in planning 
 
49 Birkland, 150. 
50 “LLIS in the HSDL,” Homeland Security Digital Library (blog), accessed April 6, 2019, 
https://www.hsdl. 
org/c/llis-in-the-hsdl/. 
51 “LLIS in the HSDL.” 
52 Lessons Learned Information Sharing, LLIS Intelligence and Information Sharing Initiative: 
Homeland Security Intelligence Requirements Process (Washington, DC: Lessons Learned Information 
Sharing, 2005), 1, https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/Final_LLIS_Intel_Reqs_Report_Dec05.pdf. 
53 Donahue and Tuohy, “Lessons We Don’t Learn,” 20. 
54 Eric Holdeman, “The Difference between Lessons Observed and Lessons Learned,” Emergency 




and responding to disasters seem to be ‘learned’ over and over again in disaster  
after disaster.”55 
C. CHANGE MANAGEMENT FOR SUCCESSFUL CHANGE 
Jeroen Stouten, Denise Rousseau, and David De Cremer wrote an article looking at 
the scholarly literature around popular change management practices used in business.56 
Their work looked at seven of the most popular schools of change management, from Kurt 
Lewin’s 1948 three-step model to John Kotter’s updated 2012 nine-step model. Stouten, 
Rousseau, and De Cremer examined the different models to look for similarities, 
differences, and best practices. While each change management model breaks change into 
a different number of phases, seven main steps can be generalized. 
• Realize change is needed 
• Choose members for change committee 
• Create change plan 
• Communicate change plan 
• Act on change plan 
• Monitor changes 
• Involve leadership  
Examining each step demonstrates how lessons learned from the field of change 
management might apply to processes outside the corporate world. 
 
55 Savoia, Agboola, and Biddinger, “Use of After Action Reports (AARs) to Promote Organizational 
and Systems Learning in Emergency Preparedness,” 2950. 
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a. Realize Change Is Needed 
Stouten, Rousseau, and De Cremer discuss the importance of recognizing that 
change is needed.57 Both Michael Beer and Rosabeth Moss Kanter write that gathering 
input from stakeholders must happen first.58 Michael Beer, an early leader in the field of 
change management, goes further by suggesting that the identification of the need for 
change should be conducted in a group setting. Identifying if change is needed and 
documenting findings in a group setting can start the change process. As Beer noted,  
“By helping people develop a shared diagnosis of what is wrong in an organization and 
what can and must be improved, a general manger mobilizes the initial commitment that is 
necessary to begin the change process.”59 
b. Choose Members for Change Committee 
Choosing who should be on a change committee can be difficult. A change 
committee can be a formal group of people tasked with guiding an organization’s change, 
or an informal group of people acting as change champions. John Kotter, one of the early 
writers of change management theory, wrote about “accelerators” in his 2012 article for 
the Harvard Business Review. Kotter explained “accelerators” were people within an 
organization who felt passionately about some aspect of the change.60 These accelerators 
are not devoted to the change full-time, but because they want to see the change happen, 
they work to shepherd it. Identifying staff members who are “volunteers” by nature might 
help in the selection change committee members. 
A question arises of whether leadership should be part of change committees. Two 
conflicting ideas exist in change management theory. Three Harvard University colleagues, 
Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Barry Stein, and Todd Jick, who wrote a set of Ten Commandments 
for change in 1992, stressed the importance of including leadership on change committees. 
 
57 Stouten, Rousseau, and De Cremer, 757. 
58 Stouten, Rousseau, and De Cremer, 757. 
59 Michael Beer, Russell A. Eisenstat, and Bert Spector, “Why Change Programs Don’t Produce 
Change,” Harvard Business Review 68, no. 6 (December 1990): 162. 
60 John P. Kotter, “Accelerate!,” Harvard Business Review 90, no. 11 (November 2012): 49. 
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They believed a strong leader could help lend a sense of legitimacy to the change.61  
Other change management proponents believe in empowering employees to facilitate 
change.62 Leadership’s role in the change process is looked at further in the last section of 
this chapter. 
c. Create Change Plan  
Another of Kanter, Stein, and Jick’s commandments charged organizations to 
develop a plan.63 Creating a change plan helps overcome the problem identified by  
Kotter, that even if employees want to change, they cannot do so unless they are given a 
plan.64 Making a change plan also helps show the changes are part of a long-term work 
plan. Employees are more likely to believe change is a priority when a change plan 
demonstrates the organization’s commitment of resources, staff time, and training.65 
Employees are more likely to provide input when an organization actively listens to their 
concerns and suggestions, which demonstrates the belief that staff may be the best source 
of improvement suggestions.66 
An interesting difference of opinion in the change management literature exists 
over whether the feedback and information collected for the change plan should focus  
on strengths or weaknesses.67 While most corporate change management models focus on 
areas needing improvement, only Appreciative Inquiry recommends focusing on strengths 
identified.68 
 
61 Stouten, Rousseau, and De Cremer, “Successful Organization Change,” 754. 
62 Stouten, Rousseau, and De Cremer, 762. 
63 Stouten, Rousseau, and De Cremer, 754. 
64 Stouten, Rousseau, and De Cremer, 765. 
65 Stouten, Rousseau, and De Cremer, 766. 
66 Jennifer Frahm and Kerry Brown, “First Steps: Linking Change Communication to Change 
Receptivity,” Journal of Organizational Change Management 20, no. 3 (2007): 384, 
http://dx.doi.org.libproxy.nps.edu/10.11 
08/09534810710740191. 
67 Stouten, Rousseau, and De Cremer, “Successful Organization Change,” 758. 
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d. Communicate Change Plan 
In their article for the Journal of Organizational Change Management, Australian 
researchers Jennifer Frahm and Kerry Brown describe successful organizational 
communication as an “information processing and uncertainty reduction activity,” which 
allows employees to feel a sense of ownership towards the change, rather than reluctance 
or fear.69 In their paper, “Organizational Learning Culture—The Missing Link between 
Business Process Change and Organizational Performance,” four economic faculty 
members of the University of Ljubljana found the importance of employees in the change 
initiative could not be overestimated.70 Perhaps Kotter stated it best, “without credible 
communication, and a lot of it, the hearts and minds of the troops are never captured.”71 
Effective communication plans incorporate visions of change, explain why change 
is important, and open communication channels to allow multi-directional communication 
flow. Gil and Mataveli note it is crucial for staff members to know what is happening in 
their organization to feel connected to the organization’s problems and solutions.72 In other 
words, employees need to understand the vision of change identified to be fully engaged 
in any IPs. Kotter again distilled the message to its essence, when he wrote, “the real power 
of a vision is unleashed only when most of those involved in an enterprise or activity have 
a common understanding of its goals and direction.”73 
One point is clear across change management strategies; those who will implement 
it must see change as possible. One way to promote the idea that change is possible is to 
communicate it often and in many modalities.74 Six of the seven change models Stouten, 
 
69 Frahm and Brown, “First Steps,” 373, 380. 
70 Miha Škerlavaj et al., “Organizational Learning Culture—The Missing Link Between Business 
Process Change and Organizational Performance,” International Journal of Production Economics 106, no. 
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71 John P. Kotter, “Leading Change Why Transformation Efforts Fail,” Harvard Business Review, 
January 2007, 96–103. 
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73 John P. Kotter, Leading Change (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1996), 85. 
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Rousseau, and De Cremer examined concur; a key element in a change plan is 
communication across as many channels as possible, including using leaders to 
communicate the change vision and serve as role models.75 The only notable exception is 
the Appreciative Inquiry model, which does not go into details on how change should be 
communicated.76 
In their article, Frahm and Brown quote a 1996 study by P. D. Witherspoon and K. 
L. Wohlert, “Communication is the process on which the initiation and maintenance of 
organizational changes depends … Ultimately the success of any change effort depends on 
how effectively the strategy for and the substance of the change is communicated to those 
who are the targets of the change.”77 In his chapter in Handbook of Principles of 
Organizational Behavior: Indispensable Knowledge for Evidence-Based Management, 
Beer writes staff need to know why a change is needed and how the new approach will 
improve outcomes.78  
Unfortunately, Frahm and Brown found information was often, “a commodity to 
be brokered and a scarce resource to be guarded and the flow of information stops at 
supervisor level.”79 They found employees often blamed managers for communications 
breakdowns and felt they had no way to pass information up the organizational ladder.80 
Kanter, Stein, and Jick also noted communication needed to be unidirectional, not just 
edicts from leaders to staff. They described how organizations need to listen to concerns 
 
75 Stouten, Rousseau, and De Cremer, 761. 
76 Stouten, Rousseau, and De Cremer, 761. 
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and comments from all staff if change committees hope to understand what the change 
means to all levels within the organization.81 
e. Act on Change Plan and Acknowledge Progress 
One area in which the most prominent change management models disagree is how 
to accomplish the desired changes by promoting new learning methods.82 Some scholars 
believe in two distinct phases of change, planning and implementing. Others believe the 
two-phase idea is a myth because change is complicated and plans alter over time as they 
are put into practice.83 Still others focus on making change part of a sustainable, long-term 
work plan, rather than have it be a single event.84  
Whether plans and implementation evolve together, or consecutively, change plans 
must be implemented, not just put on a shelf. This implementation requires a commitment 
to the plan and a desire to truly change.85 Kotter’s Eight-Step Model is one of the early 
change management theories to encourage incorporating easy wins from low-hanging 
fruit.86 This idea of early and easy wins can also provide opportunities to highlight 
successful changes to internal and external stakeholders, which thus sustains the change 
momentum.  
In her article, “Change is Everyone’s Job,” Rosabeth Moss Kanter wrote about 
using teaching and mentoring as methods to move change forward in an organization. She 
included a section about creating contests to highlight best practices in an organization with 
a prize of travel to other branches to teach the winning method to others.87 While Kanter 
wrote strictly in terms of the business world, similar approaches can be seen at emergency 
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management conferences where best practices from one jurisdiction are presented as case 
studies to others. 
f. Monitor Changes 
In 1980, Beer added something unique to change management; the idea that 
changes should be tracked and altered as needed.88 More than two decades later, in his 
book, ADKAR: A Model for Change in Business, Government and Our Community, Jeffery 
Hiatt wrote about the idea that change, if left by itself, will fizzle out and employees will 
revert to old ways of doing things. Instead, those managing change must try different tactics 
encourage change. Ideas such as positive feedback, recognition, rewards, celebrations, 
accountability, and audit systems, can help reinforce the new, desired behaviors and ensure 
changes becomes the new normal.89  
g. Involve Leadership 
Leadership support is important for successful changes because it lends legitimacy 
to the change, acknowledges change will make improvements, and puts management’s 
authority behind the change. Many change management writers believe leadership support 
is crucial.90 In Kanter, Stein, and Jick’s work on change titled: The Challenge of 
Organizational Change: How Companies Experience It and Leaders Guide It, their fifth 
commandment might be the key to understanding why change efforts frequently fail. The 
fifth commandment states a strong leader’s support improves the chance of success because 
the changed is believed to be legitimate.91 If senior leadership is not involved in the change, 
participants doubt the sincerity of the change.  
In their article titled, “Why Organizations Don’t Learn,” Francesca Gino and 
Bradley Staats note another possible reason organizations do not change is that “leaders 
across organizations may say that learning comes from failure, but their actions show a 
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preoccupation with success.”92 Mistakes are seen as wastes of time, money, and 
resources.93 When a leader is involved in the change process, she admits room for 
improvement exists in organizational processes. Other scholars of change management 
note failures help organizations learn.94 When leadership truly understands learning can 
come from mistakes, staff do not fear providing truthful and accurate process analysis. 
Beer noted employee’s frustration when newly learned skills and business methods 
went unused and unappreciated because organizational policies had not changed.95 
Leadership support for change means authority is behind change plans, and employees see 
an expectation to use their new skills. Change does not merely come from altering how an 
organization is structured, but from actually working in a new and better manner.96  
Many change management models Stouten, Rousseau, and De Cremer compared 
note the importance of leadership buy-in.97 When leaders promotes change, they facilitate 
change.98 Beer wrote, “effective change leadership enhances organizational performance, 
economic value, and organizational effectiveness.”99 Applying Beer’s ideas to emergency 
management and first responder communities, effective change leadership can enhance 
community preparedness, resource sharing, and interagency cooperation.  
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III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This thesis looked at communication of after-action findings on visible policy, 
training, or behavior changes in employees across four authority levels in government, 
healthcare, first responder, and emergency management agencies. This chapter explains 
the collection methods and data analysis tools used. A quantitative survey, qualitative 
interviews, and literature review address the following research questions. 
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
• Do preparedness exercises result in visible policy, training, or behavior 
changes seen by front-line employees and first-level managers? 
• Do after-action event experiences of upper-level management differ from 
front-line employees and first-level managers? 
• In agencies with successful after-action events, what factors account for 
their success? 
• What innovative solutions can help overcome the remaining challenges 
hindering successful after-action processes? 
B. QUANTITATIVE SURVEY METHOD 
A survey collected data about policy, training, and behavior changes witnessed by 
four authority levels in different preparedness agencies. This survey also asked respondents 
about opportunities to read after-action documents and IPs following preparedness 
exercises. This section explains the survey’s development, respondents, and 
implementation. 
1. Survey Participants 
Survey respondents were users of the New Mexico Department of Health’s learning 
management system, NM.TRAIN.org. The database had approximately 10,900 users at the 
time of the survey. Users worked for government agencies, healthcare providers, 
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emergency management, law enforcement, fire service, and emergency medical services 
(EMS). One hundred sixty-five respondents consented and completed the survey. Chapter 
IV presents a detailed description of survey respondent demographics. For a complete 
listing of the survey questions, please see Appendix A.  
2. Survey Development 
The survey was a conditional branching survey that employed skip logic to direct 
respondents to relevant questions based on their previous answers. It included a maximum 
of 14 questions focused on experiences following preparedness exercises. The first 
question series asked the respondent if their agency had been part of a preparedness 
exercise, and if yes, had they themselves been involved in the exercise: 
• Has your employer or agency conducted or been part of a preparedness 
exercise in the last two years? Answer Options: Yes; No; I don’t know 
• Did you participate in the preparedness exercise? Answer Options: Yes; 
No; I don’t know 
• What was your role? Answer Options: Player; Controller/Evaluator; 
Exercise Planner; Observer; SimCell Participant (Choose all that apply) 
Respondents who answered they had participated in a preparedness exercise were 
asked if their agency had provided them an opportunity to read the after-action 
documentation and the IP:  
• After the preparedness exercise(s) did your agency provided you an 
opportunity to read after-action documents? Answer Options: Yes; No; I 
don’t know  
• After the preparedness exercise(s) did your agency provided you an 
opportunity to read the Improvement Plan (IP), a document that identifies 
specific corrective action steps and assigns them to responsible parties 
with an established target date for completion? Answer Options: Yes; No; 
I don’t know  
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The next series of questions asked the respondent if they had seen agency changes 
in either policy or training, or if they had personal changed behavior as a result of gaps 
identified by the preparedness exercise:  
• Have you seen a policy change at your agency addressing gaps identified 
by the preparedness exercise(s)? Answer Options: Yes; No; I don’t know  
• Have you experienced any training changes at your agency addressing 
gaps identified by the preparedness exercise(s)? Answer Options: Yes; 
No; I don’t know  
• Have you personally changed any behavior as a result of a gap identified 
by the preparedness exercise? Answer Options: Yes; No; I don’t know  
The final series of questions asked the respondent demographic information, 
including employer type and authority level within their agency:  
• Type of employer: Answer Options: Government (any level); Healthcare 
provider; Emergency management; Fire service; Law enforcement; EMS; 
Other  
• Are you a: Answer Options: Front-line employee (not supervisor or 
manager); First line supervisor (report to a manager and front-line 
employees report to you); Middle level manager (supervisors or lower 
management report to you); Senior level manager (middle managers report 
to you)  
3. Survey Administration 
Every NM.TRAIN.org user who selected to receive email notifications was sent an 
email asking for participation in an academic survey. See Appendix B for survey 
participation request. The survey was put into the Naval Postgraduate School’s electronic 
Lime Survey account and a survey link was included in the email. A similar email with the 
Lime Survey link was sent as a reminder 10 days after the initial email. See Appendix C. 
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No further emails were sent. Results of the survey were downloaded into an Excel 
spreadsheet for analysis.  
4. Survey Analysis 
The initial question series separated out respondents who stated their agency had 
been part of a preparedness exercise in the last two years. These respondents were further 
filtered to leave only the respondents who had participated in their agency’s preparedness 
exercise. The respondents were asked if their organization provided them an opportunity 
to read any after-action documentation or IPs.  
The respondents were then asked if they saw any changes in their organization 
because of gaps identified by the preparedness exercise. Specifically, the first question 
asked if respondents saw any policy changes addressing changes made at the strategic 
level. The second question asked if changes in training were visible, addressing the 
possibility of changes at the worker level, rather than at an organizational level. Finally, 
respondents were asked if they personally changed behavior as a result of exercise-
identified gaps. This question attempted to capture possible changes at the individual level.  
The last section collected demographic data on the survey respondents, which 
identified the type of preparedness agency they worked for, and their authority level. This 
data helped in analyzing the respondents’ answers and grouping respondents into similar 
authority level categories across response types. The authority-level demographic allowed 
the researcher to filter data and identify connections between front-line employees and 
first-level managers, as opposed to mid- and senior-level managers. 
C. QUALITATIVE INTERVIEW METHOD 
In addition to the quantitative survey, exercise professionals were recruited to 
participate in semi-structured telephone interviews. See Appendix D for the recruitment 
email. Potential interview subjects were recruited by asking local master exercise 
practitioners (MEPs), Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS) cohort 
members, and exercise colleagues for names of potential interview subjects who had 
experienced successful after-action events. Possible interview subjects were emailed the 
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recruitment request. Candidates who did not respond received a follow-up email asking for 
an interview and used a similar script about two weeks later. See Appendix E for follow-
up email. Non-responsive candidates received no further contact. 
Six interviews were conducted and each lasted between 20 and 45 minutes with fire 
service professionals, police officers, emergency managers, and safety directors. These 
interviews discussed the topic of after-action events from the professional exercise 
creators’ perspective. 
1. Interview Protocol and Administration 
Six telephone interviews were conducted using the computer program Zoom to 
record them for later transcription. The decision to interview six subjects across a variety 
of disciplines ensured inclusion of a broad spectrum of experiences. To avoid even the 
appearance of coercion, no healthcare provider exercise professionals were considered as 
candidates.  
The following four questions were asked of each interviewee: 
• What does your process look like after an exercise concludes? 
• What factors do you think account for your successful after-action events?  
• What was the genesis of your current, successful after-action process? 
• Tell me about your experience with facilitating preparedness exercises 
In addition, a series of possible prompts were listed under each main question to 
elicit detail or guide the interviewee back to the main topic, if needed. See Appendix F for 
a complete list of questions and possible prompts. The interviews were conducted 
individually, over three weeks, at the interview subjects’ convenience. The interview audio 
files were transcribed for accuracy and yielded 76 pages. Before analyzing the interviews, 
each subject was given a code (A1–F6) to ensure anonymity. 
 
28 
2. Analysis of Qualitative Data 
Interviews were analyzed by repeated close readings. Similar topics and 
experiences were identified in the six transcripts and collated in a spreadsheet. Overlapping 
ideas were grouped into two main themes, and each was further divided into three 
subthemes. These themes and sub-themes explored the exercise professional’s perspective 
on after-action events. 
3. Integration of Literature, Quantitative and Qualitative Results 
Chapter VI integrates findings from the change management literature with the 
quantitative survey results and interview themes. A three-column chart presents a 
generalized set of change management steps, relates each step to an HSEEP strength, and 
ties both to challenges still faced by exercise professionals, as related in their interviews.  
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter outlined the research methods used to analyze change management 
literature, the quantitative survey, and the qualitative interviews. Quantitative survey data 
was analyzed to identify if patterns exist between an employee’s authority level and their 
after-action experiences. Qualitative interviews were conducted to collect data from 
exercise professionals about their after-action experiences. Information was collected from 
both exercise participants and exercise professionals to compare the experiences of the one 
with the expectations of the other.  
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IV. QUANTITATIVE SURVEY RESULTS
This chapter presents the quantitative survey findings designed to address Research 
Questions #1 Do preparedness exercises result in visible policy, training, or behavior 
changes seen by front-line employees and first-level managers, and #2 Do after-action 
event experiences of upper-level management differ from front-line employees and first-
level managers?  
The survey questions collected after-action experience data from preparedness 
stakeholders of differing agency authority levels to determine if authority levels affected 
after-action experiences. Questions asked about three possible ways identified gaps could 
be addressed: (1) changes in policy, which upper-level managers might see, (2) changes in 
training, which front-line staff and first-level managers, the “doers” of an agency might 
see, and (3) changes in personal behavior, which encompassed employees who made 
changes on their own, without waiting for official policy or training directives.  
One hundred sixty-five respondents from the New Mexico Department of Health’s 
learning management database completed the survey. Respondents were front-line staff 
and first-level, mid-level, and senior-level managers. Respondents represented a variety of 
stakeholders.  
The analysis is organized into five parts: (1) participant demographics, (2) exercise 
involvement, (3) changes observed, (4) opportunity to read after-action documents, and 
(5) opportunity to read IPs. 
A. PARTICIPANT DEMOGRAPHICS 
Table 1 shows the seven agency types that participated in the survey: government, 
healthcare provider, emergency management, EMS, fire service, law enforcement, and 
other. The table cross references the respondent’s agency type with their level of authority: 
front-line staff, first-line manager, mid-level manager, and senior manager. The two agency 
types most represented were government employee (45.5%) and healthcare provider 
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employee (31.5%). For government employees, 46 were front-line staff, 20 were first-level 
managers, five were mid-level managers, and four were senior-level managers. For 
healthcare providers, 21 were front-line staff, 16 were first-level managers, seven were 
mid-level managers, and eight were senior-level managers.  
Table 1. Demographics of Respondents 
Demographics of 
Respondents by Agency 














Government 46 20 5 4 75 
Healthcare 21 16 7 8 52 
Emergency Management 4 2 0 0 6 
EMS 3 2 2 0 7 
Fire Service 0 2 1 1 4 
Law Enforcement 1 0 1 1 3 
Other 10 4 2 2 18 
Total 85 46 18 16 165 
B. EXERCISE INVOLVEMENT 
The 165 respondents were asked if their agency took part in a preparedness exercise 
within the previous two years. Those who responded in the affirmative were asked if they 
themselves participated in the exercise. Those who responded “Yes” to both questions were 
asked to select the role or roles they had in their agency’s preparedness exercise.  
Table 2 shows 118 respondents or 71.5% responded “Yes,” 34 or 20.6% responded 
“No,” and 13 or 7.9% responded “I don’t know” when asked if their agency had been part 
of a preparedness exercise. 
 
31 
Table 2. Agency Participation in Exercise 
Agency Participated in Preparedness 
Exercise in the Last Two Years? 
Number Percentage 
Yes 118 71.5% 
No 34 20.6% 
I Don’t Know 13 7.9% 
Total 165 100.0% 
 
As shown in Figure 1, upon examining the 118 “Yes” responses, just under half 
(48.3%) were front-line employees and nearly a third (31.3%) were first-level managers. 
The remaining responses, (20.4%), were divided evenly between mid-level and senior-
level managers, each reporting 10.2% yes responses. This division of responses by 
authority level is not surprising. The source of the survey respondents was a database for a 
learning management system of online training courses. More front-line staff and first-
level managers use online learning, and therefore, are in the learning management database 
than mid- or senior-level management.  
 





Percentage of Respondents Reporting Their Agency 
Participated in a Preparedness Exercise by Agency Authority 
Level
Front-line Employees First-level Managers
Mid-level Managers Senior-level Managers
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The second question asked the 118 participants if they themselves participated in 
the exercise. Table 3 shows 85 or 72.0% responded “Yes,” 31 or 26.3% responded “No,” 
and two or 1.7% responded they did not know if they had been a part of a preparedness 
exercise.  
Table 3. Individual Participation in Exercise 
Response to Individual 
Participation in Exercise? 
Number Percentage 
Yes 85 72.0% 
No 31 26.3% 
I Don’t Know 2 1.7% 
Total 118 100.0% 
 
As seen in Figure 2, of the 85 participants who participated in a preparedness 
exercise, nearly half of the respondents (42.4%) were front-line employees and almost a 
third (32.9%) were first-level managers. The remaining 24.7% was nearly evenly divided 
between mid-level managers (12.9%), and senior-level managers (11.8%). The 
overwhelming participation of front-line staff and first-level management is not surprising, 
as those populations are frequently the level targeted for preparedness exercise play.  
This question shows that the majority of the survey respondents who participated in a 
preparedness exercise within the last two years are either front-line employees or first-level 




Figure 2. Authority Level of Preparedness Exercise Participants 
As indicated in Table 4, a follow-up question asked participants their role in the 
exercise. Of the 85 respondents who participated in an exercise, the largest percentage at 
each authority level participated as a player. This response is consistent with exercise 
structure requiring more players than any other role. Managers of all levels participated as 
exercise controllers or evaluators more frequently than front-line employees, and mid-level 
managers were nearly twice as likely (25.0%) as front-line employees (13.0%) to serve as 
exercise creators. Responses totaled more than 85 because respondents were allowed to 











Percentage of Preparedness Exercise Participants by 
Agency Authority
Front-line Employees First-level Managers
Mid-level Managers Senior-level Managers
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Player  50.0% 40.0% 35.0% 42.9%  
 27 16 7 6 56 
Controller/Evaluator 14.8% 22.5% 20.0% 28.6%  
 8 9 4 4 25 
Exercise Planner 13.0% 17.5% 25.0% 14.3%  
 7 7 5 2 21 
Observer 16.7% 15.0% 15.0% 14.3%  
 9 6 3 2 20 
SimCell Participant 5.6% 5.0% 5.0% 0.0%  
 3 2 1 0 6 
Total 54 40 20 14 128 
 
C. CHANGES OBSERVED 
A series of survey questions asked the 118 respondents if they had observed 
organizational policy or training changes, or personal behavior changes as a result of the 
preparedness exercise. As the HSEEP explains, exercises assess and evaluate: 
The ability to meet exercise objectives and capabilities by documenting 
strengths, areas for improvement, core capability performance, and 
corrective actions in an After-Action Report/Improvement Plan (AAR/IP). 
Through improvement planning, organizations take the corrective actions 
needed to improve plans, build and sustain capabilities, and maintain 
readiness.100  
Beginning with the visibility of policy change question, Table 5 shows only 40 
respondents or 33.9% answered “Yes,” 49 or 41.5% responded “No,” and 29 or 24.6% 
responded that they did not know if they had seen a policy change to address a gap 
 




identified by the preparedness exercise. Combining those who did not see a policy change 
and those who were not sure, the percentage climbs to nearly two thirds (66.1%).  
Table 5. Visible Policy Change 
Response to Visible Policy Change? Number Percentage 
Yes 40 33.9% 
No 49 41.5% 
I Don’t Know 29 24.6% 
Total 118 100.0% 
 
Table 6 shows the response broken out by agency authority. Less than a quarter 
(22.8%) of front-line employees saw a policy change addressing a gap identified by the 
preparedness exercise. First-level managers were not that much better, only slightly over 
one third (37.8%) believed they had seen a policy change. Mid-level managers were the 
only category where a large majority (66.7%) responded they had seen a policy change. 
Less than half (41.7%) of senior-level managers reported seeing a policy change. This 
response could be the result of mid-level managers writing policy changes, agencies not 
changing policies, or policy changes not being a result of gaps identified by preparedness 
exercises.  













Yes 22.8% 37.8% 66.7% 41.7%  
 13 14 8 5 40 
No 43.9% 40.5% 16.7% 58.3%  
 25 15 2 7 49 
I Don’t Know 33.3% 21.6% 16.7% 0.0%  
 19 8 2 0 29 




The second question in this series asked respondents if they observed training 
changes addressing a gap identified by the exercise. Table 7 shows 52 respondents or 
44.1% answered “Yes,” 47 or 39.8% responded “No,” and 19 or 16.1% responded they did 
not know if they had seen training changes. Combining those who did not see any training 
change and those who were not sure, the percentage climbs to over half (55.9%).  
Table 7. Visible Training Change 
Response to Visible 
Training Change? 
Number Percentage 
Yes 52 44.1% 
No 47 39.8% 
I Don’t Know 19 16.1% 
Total 118 100.0% 
 
Table 8 shows the response, by agency authority, to the same question on visible 
training changes addressing gaps identified by the preparedness exercise. From this 
breakout, it is clear just over a third (35.1%) of front-line employees had seen a change in 
training addressing a gap, but 45.6% did not, and 19.3% were not sure. First-level managers 
were better, with 45.9% believing they saw a training change. However, those not seeing 
a change and those unsure were the majority, at 54.1%. Again, mid-level managers were 
the only category where a large majority (75.0%) responded they saw a training change. 
Senior-level managers were evenly split, 50% reporting they had seen a training change, 









Table 8. Visible Training Change by Authority Level 











Yes 35.1% 45.9% 75.0% 50.0%  
 20 17 9 6 52 
No 45.6% 35.1% 16.7% 50.0%  
 26 13 2 6 47 
I Don’t Know 19.3% 18.9% 8.3% 0.0%  
 11 7 1 0 19 
Total 57 37 12 12 118 
 
The final question in this series asked respondents if they had personally changed 
their behavior as a result of gaps identified by the preparedness exercise. Table 9 shows 71 
or 60.2%, a majority of respondents, answered “Yes,” 40 or 33.9% responded “No,” and 
seven or 5.9% responded that they did not know if they changed their behavior as a result 
of a gap identified by the exercise. For the first time, the majority of respondents answered 
in the affirmative (60.2%).  
Table 9. Personally Changed Behavior 
Response to Personally Changed 
Behavior? 
Number Percentage 
Yes 71 60.2% 
No 40 33.9% 
I Don’t Know 7 5.9% 











Table 10 shows the response, by agency authority, to the question on personally 
changing behavior to address gaps identified by the preparedness exercise. This breakout 
shows more than half (54.4%) of front-line employees report changing their behavior to 
address a gap. First-level managers are nearly the same, with 56.8% believing they changed 
their behavior. Again, mid-level managers were the highest category, with 83.3% 
responding they had changed their behavior. A majority of senior-level managers also 
reported changing their behavior (75.0%).  














Yes 54.4% 56.8% 83.3% 75.0%  
 31 21 10 9 71 
No 40.4% 35.1% 16.7% 16.7%  
 23 13 2 2 40 
I Don’t Know 5.3% 8.1% 0% 8.3%  
 3 3 0 1 7 
Total 57 37 12 12 118 
 
Tables 6, 8, and 10 begin to answer Research Question #1: Do preparedness 
exercises result in visible policy, training, or behavior changes visible to front-line 
employees and first-level managers? The survey findings show that few front-line (22.8%) 
and first-level managers (37.8%) believe they saw policy changes addressing gaps 
identified by preparedness exercises. Survey findings increased slightly when front-line 
(35.1%) and first-level managers (45.9%) were asked if they had seen training changes 
addressing gaps identified. The question of personal behavior change was the only time 
when the “Yes” responses increase above 50 percent for both front-line (54.4%) and first-
level managers (56.8%).  
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Tables 6, 8, and 10 also attempt to answer Research Question #2: Do after-action 
event experiences of upper-level management differ from front-line employees and first-
level managers? The survey results show differences between mid- and senior-level 
managers and front-line staff and first-level managers. While two thirds of mid-level 
managers (66.7%) reported seeing policy changes, more than half (58.3%) of senior-level 
managers reported they had not seen policy changes. This result is surprising; given policy 
change is normally considered to be implemented from the top down.  
Policy change might not be visible to staff of lower authority levels because they 
might not read policies. However, training changes should be more visible to front-line and 
first-level employees, as they are the ones who do the work. The second question in this 
series asked respondents if they saw training changes to address gaps identified by 
preparedness exercises. The experience of front-line employees and first-level managers 
were similar and differed from upper-level managers. Nearly two-thirds (64.9%) of front-
line employees and 56.0% of first-level managers reported they did not or were not sure if 
they had seen any training changes. This response is surprising. It is also surprising that 
75.0% of mid-level managers reported they had seen training changes; mid-level managers 
are not the usual target for training updates. Senior-level managers were split evenly 
between those reporting seeing a training change and those reporting they had not.  
Even asking about personal behavior changes, the survey still shows differences 
between upper-level managers, and lower-level staff. Both front-line staff (54.4%) and 
first-level managers (56.8%) responded nearly identically in the affirmative. However, 
mid- and senior-level managers responded “Yes” at much higher rates, 83.3% and 75.0%, 
respectively.  
Looking at these three questions together, a clear difference can be seen between 
upper-levels of management and the front-line and first-level staff. This difference is 
further illustrated by responses to questions about opportunities to view AARs and IPs. 
D. OPPORTUNITY TO READ AFTER-ACTION DOCUMENTS  
The survey asked respondents if they were given an opportunity to read after-action 
documents. Table 11 shows that 48.3% of the respondents felt their agency had provided 
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them an opportunity to read after-action documents. However, 32.2% said they were not 
given the opportunity and a further 19.5% responded they were unsure. Taken together, 
respondents who were not given an opportunity, and those unsure represent more than half 
of the respondents (51.7%). 
Table 11. Opportunity to Read After-Action Documents 
Provided an Opportunity to 
Read AA Documents? 
Number Percentage 
Yes 57 48.3% 
No 38 32.2% 
I Don’t Know 23 19.5% 
Total 118 100.0% 
  
Breaking the responses out by authority level shows where after-action 
documentation fails to be communicated in an organization. Front-line staff 
overwhelmingly (61.4%) responded they were uncertain if or were not provided an 
opportunity to read the after-action documents, while only 38.6% felt they were provided 
an opportunity to read them. A majority of first-level managers (54.1%) reported they were 
given an opportunity read the after-action documentation, while 45.9% reported they were 
uncertain if or were not given an opportunity to read them. In contrast, two thirds of mid-
level managers, (66.7%), and more than half, (58.3%) of senior-level managers, reported 
they were given an opportunity to read the after-action documents.  
The remaining 33.4% of mid-level and 41.7% of senior-level managers reported 
they were not given or were uncertain if they had been provided an opportunity to read the 
after-action documents. It is unlikely upper-level leaders follow up on actionable findings 




















Yes 38.6% 54.1% 66.7% 58.3%  
 22 20 8 7 57 
No 36.8% 35.1% 16.7% 16.7%  
 21 13 2 2 38 
I Don’t Know 24.6% 10.8% 16.7% 25.0%  
 14 4 2 3 23 
Total 57 37 12 12 118 
  
E. OPPORTUNITY TO READ IPS 
The final section of the survey asked respondents if their agency provided them an 
opportunity to read the IP. Table 13 shows only 37.3% of the respondents felt their agency 
provided them an opportunity. Almost half (44.9%) said they were not provided an 
opportunity and a further 17.8% responded they were unsure if they were given an 
opportunity. Taken together, respondents who were unsure and those who were not given 
an opportunity represent more than half of the respondents (62.7%). 
Table 13. Opportunity to Read IP 
Provided an Opportunity 
to Read IP Documents? 
Number Percentage 
Yes 44 37.3% 
No 53 44.9% 
I Don’t Know 21 17.8% 





Examining the responses by agency authority level, only 24.6% of front-line 
employees reported they had been provided an opportunity to read the IP. More than  
half, (56.1%) reported they had not been provided the opportunity and a further 19.3% 
were not sure. A difference is seen between front-line staff and the first-level managers.  
A higher percentage of first-level managers (43.2%) reported having the opportunity to 
read the IP, with 37.8% reporting they were not given the opportunity and 18.9% reporting 
they were unsure.  














Yes 24.6% 43.2% 66.7% 50.0%  
 14 16 8 6 44 
No 56.1% 37.8% 33.3% 25.0%  
 32 14 4 3 53 
I Don’t Know 19.3% 18.9% 0% 25.0%  
 11 7 0 3 21 
Total 57 37 12 12 118 
 
A third (33.3%) of mid-level managers and a quarter (25.0%) of senior-level 
managers reported they had not been given an opportunity to read the IP. Adding in those 
upper-levels of managers who were unsure of their opportunity to read the IP, the 
percentage increases to 50.0% for senior-level managers. Managing change in an 
organization requires the support of leadership; upper-level management must be included 




Table 15. Summary of Visible Changes and Opportunities Provided 














38.6% 54.1% 66.7% 58.3% 
 22 20 8 7 
Yes—Opportunity to 
Read Improvement Plan 
24.6% 43.2% 66.7% 50.0% 
 14 16 8 6 
Yes—Visible Policy 
Change 
22.8% 37.8% 66.7% 41.7% 
 13 14 8 5 
Yes—Visible Training 
Change 
35.1% 45.9% 75.0% 50.0% 
 20 17 9 6 
Yes—Visible Personal 
Behavior Change 
54.4% 56.8% 83.3% 75.0% 
 31 21 10 9 
 
F. SUMMARY 
This chapter outlined the quantitative survey results to identify if patterns exist 
between an employee’s after-action experience and their authority level. Overall, the data 
shows few front-line employees were provided an opportunity to read after-action 
documentation (38.6%) or an IP (24.6%) following a preparedness exercise. First-level 
managers reported slightly higher opportunities to read after-action documents (54.1%) 
and IPs (43.2%) than front-line employees. The difference between employees of lower 
authority level (front-line staff and first-level managers) and higher authority level (mid-
level managers) is striking in regards to policy and training changes seen. An interesting 
shift is seen with senior-level managers reporting lower levels in all categories, compared 
to mid-level managers.  
 
44 
Chapter V will examine findings from the six, semi-structured qualitative 
interviews and highlight the commonalities and continuing barriers expressed by exercise 
professionals in regards to implementing successful after-action events.  
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V. QUALITATIVE INTERVIEW RESULTS 
Six telephone interviews were conducted to collect information from first responder 
and emergency management exercise professionals. Chapter III—Research Methodology 
describes the interview transcription and coding process. Interviews were analyzed for 
common themes. Themes were divided into two main categories, factors accounting for 
successful after-action processes, and innovative solutions to remaining challenges.  
All interviews were confidential; interviewees were assigned codes (A1–F6), their 
names, agencies, and identifying information were withheld. 
A. GENESIS OF SUCCESSFUL AFTER-ACTION PROCESSES 
Understanding how an agency’s after-action process became successful is 
important to identify possible steps other organizations could emulate. With this goal, 
interview questions attempted to find the factors that accounted for successful after-action 
processes by asking exercise professionals about their successful events. This section 
discusses the three similar factors exercise creators identified as helping create successful 
after-action events. 
1. Leadership 
The importance of leadership involvement was highlighted repeatedly in the 
interviews. One interviewee (A1) spoke about the role leaders played in helping focus 
efforts and speed up change, saying, “Leadership can kind of help shape which corrective 
actions are prioritized or if we need to kind of accelerate some of our planning and outreach 
timelines.” Another respondent (F6) summarized the situation even more clearly, “You 
have to have buy-in from the top. Nothing gets done without instructions from the boss.”  
Understanding it can be difficult for leadership to admit mistakes, the same 
respondent (F6) summarized the difficultly exercise professionals face when creating a 
challenging exercise:  
Where leaders need to switch their thinking is not in [thinking] any mistake 
is bad … —we all make mistakes, what are you doing about it? And if you 
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have a successful program that leads to the improvement over areas where 
you’re weak, that’s something to write home about. 
A strength several respondents touched upon was experienced leadership. Some 
mentioned leaders who rose up through the ranks and had experience “in the trenches” as 
one respondent put it (B2). Experienced leaders moved their programs forward easier, 
because they knew what was possible. A similar effect was noted by several respondents 
(D4 and C3) when leaders were locals and had grown up in their regions. Interviewees 
noted local leaders showed more willingness to engage in preparedness exercises and the 
after-action work.  
The exercise professionals interviewed also noted they looked to their leadership 
for plan development. They expected their leaders to listen to input of mid-level managers 
but then allow those mid-level managers the autonomy to implement plans at the tactical 
level (E5). Exercise professionals spoke of trusting their leaders and how that trust must 
flow in both directions. Leadership must trust them, too. “At the highest level, it’s 
important to help your leader understand what is gained by going through the after-action 
process, how it is important, and to give the weight of their position to the process” (F6). 
2. Training Due to Real-World Events 
Real-world events played a role in the way several respondents’ agencies conducted 
after-action events. Real-world events could be positive or negative; ranging from a 
community festival to a school shooting. Many respondents spoke about maintaining a 
database of corrective actions identified during preparedness exercises, but one respondent, 
(A1), noted that his organization also incorporated items in that database from real-world 
emergency responses to remind staff of the connection between exercises and real-world 
consequences.  
A1’s methods are not unique, but his visible success is dramatic proof of the 
relationship between exercises and incidents. A1’s agency created a series of exercises 
relating to family assistance centers. Less than a year later when a major incident happened 
in his jurisdiction, A1’s agency demonstrated successful execution of many objectives 
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exercised recently. “We did a very good job with patient tracking and family reunification 
and understanding kind of the different roles and process for that whole cycle.” (A1) 
Real-world events can also highlight what one respondent (E5) called “perishable 
skills.” This respondent spoke about skills first responders use during active shooter or 
hostage situations. These rare situations require alterations of normal skill sets used on 
more routine calls. He spoke of conducting community exercises in actual soft target 
locations because similar places were targeted in other parts of the nation. These 
community exercises allowed practice of those rarely used, “perishable skills” to “frontload 
a significant amount of training” (E5). This interviewee, (E5), attributed frontloading 
training and exercising in actual community locations as the reason why his agency 
successfully stopped an active shooter with minimal loss of life in the same location just a 
few months later.  
Another respondent, (C3), spoke about planned, real-world events like community 
festivals, and how these annual events allow participants an opportunity to exercise new 
ideas and compare findings to previous years. He explained how his agency identified gaps 
after an annual event and implemented training to address the problem. The event identified 
communication challenges between various safety stakeholders. The following year,  
his agency implemented a new command and control communication strategy for the event. 
Based on an identified problem and the training put into place to address the gap,  
C3’s community corrected a problem within one year.  
3. Community and Interagency Involvement 
All exercise professionals interviewed spoke about the importance of exercising 
with other agencies and community partners. Several (B2 and E5) spoke about specific real 
world events that occurred in their communities and how those tragedies highlighted the 
need to exercise together.  
A common reason for exercising with other preparedness partners is 
communication difficulties often exist between different first responder groups. 
Communication challenges are often a finding in exercises (B2, E5, C3, and D4). One 
interviewee explained:  
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Example, every year communications, like in any drill, is always a failure. 
So we build upon that. And some of the problems that we’ve been having—
and what we want our response agencies to do—annually, they’re used to 
be on their own channels. Fire’s on the fire channel. Law enforcement on 
the law enforcement channel. But every year, we try to get them to go to the 
V channels to the interoperability channels because we want them to be able 
[to talk] (B2). 
The interviewee further went on to explain this gap would not have been identified 
if the different agencies had not been exercising together. 
A different interviewee, (E5), spoke about integrating training between first 
responder groups so each understood not only their role, but the role they played as a 
coordinated group, “It was an entire—you know, both agencies getting together that 
significantly helped on the front-end to make the incident itself work out.”  
A good example was given by F6, who recalled an exercise with the objective of 
setting up temporary shelters for refugees or evacuees. The exercise found significant delay 
in shelter set-up when the normally desk-bound, social services staff were solely 
responsible for gathering equipment and cots. F6 spoke about combining parks and 
recreation services staff with the social services staff because the parks and recreation staff 
were normally at the sites. In later events, the onsite parks and recreation employees at 
shelter locations followed shelter set-up blueprints and had shelters ready up to 20 minutes 
earlier than when social services staff set up alone.  
B. REMAINING CHALLENGES AND INNOVATIVE SOLUTIONS 
Despite conducting preparedness exercises to strengthen response capabilities, 
agencies still face barriers to improving areas identified as deficient. Barriers can come 
from both outside and inside the organization. Interviewing exercise professionals, three 
barriers preventing improvements were identified along with a work-around for each 
challenge. 
1. Fear of Identifying Weaknesses 
Creating a challenging exercise that identifies areas for improvement is important. 
As one respondent put it, “It’s not really worth doing an exercise unless you are able to 
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document some findings and areas for improvement” (A1). He went on to say, “We don’t 
sugarcoat it or make everyone think that the exercise is a total success and there were no 
issues” (A1). Another interviewee spoke about the concern that participants and evaluators 
do not send truthful feedback or evaluations. As the exercise professional (C3) explained: 
Sometimes I feel like … the feedback that we’ll receive gets kind of 
sterilized. And it’s because they either don’t want to admit that there was 
an issue, or they don’t want [it] to be written down where it could be, you 
know, seen by people in the future and asked why didn’t we correct this. 
And I feel like that’s part of the problem. We don’t always accurately reflect 
upon the exercise. 
The challenge for exercise professionals is not just creating an exercise that 
challenges participants and identifies areas for improvement. The challenge lies in honestly 
documenting the findings. 
SOLUTION: Exercise professionals create an atmosphere of trust to receive accurate 
feedback about capability gaps.  
HSEEP takes pains to remind participants that exercises are a no fault, learning 
environment. As one interviewee explained:  
If people won’t tell you what they didn’t do right or they’re afraid to speak 
about themselves or their peers, you’re never going to have the true 
improvement that you really, really crave. Anybody can write an exercise. 
And exercises are good or bad, what have you, but the after-action process 
is the crucial piece to it all. Are you learning from this or are you just putting 
on a show for somebody? (F6) 
Without the trust of the participants, exercise players will not identify their weak 
areas. Those weak areas must be documented in after-action reports because those areas 
are the capabilities that need strengthening.  
Trust must also include leadership. Exercise professionals must take pains to 
explain to leaders the gaps identified by an exercise are not something to be ashamed of or 
hide. Often, exercise professionals are put into a position of explaining to leaders the areas 
in which to improve. As one interviewee explained:  
Convincing your leadership that what is important is gained by showing 
your dirty laundry, warts and all, is so important to the organization and 
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actually shows true leadership, that you know everybody at the end of it 
knows there’s things that didn’t go right (F6)  
Once an agency accepts some areas need improvement, the exercise professional 
can “look at their boss or senior-elected official and go, ‘We weren’t good at this. We fixed 
it, and now we’re good at it’” (F6).  
2. Drifting Attention 
A second challenge exercise professionals noted is simply the loss of attention or 
momentum once an exercise ends. Leadership may agree with the after-action findings, but 
not follow through because their attention shifts. An interviewee explained, “I feel like the 
idea and the concept behind the after-action report is usually general accepted. It’s just the 
implementation is not always there” (C3). The same exercise professional went on to 
explain the lack of follow through is not malicious, “The problem is that, you know, 
everybody has ten other jobs they’re doing, and the exercise is a priority maybe during the 
exercise. And then afterwards, it kind of starts to slip over time” (C3).  
Several exercise professionals commented on the lack of follow through being a 
challenge to implementing IPs successfully. One interview respondent, (F6), said, “It’s 
easy for people to walk away from this [improvement] process unless, you know, the orders 
from the top are to participate, and then everybody understands why it’s important.”  
SOLUTION: Exercise professionals identify improvement-item champions and 
foster leadership involvement.  
One interviewee, (C3), spoke of the value of having “a couple of people who act as 
champions” of certain improvement items, but that even then “it doesn’t always last. Other 
things take priority.” Another interviewee spoke about the value of having someone at a 
command staff level take responsibility for an IP item (D4). The interviewee commented 
on the value of assigning responsibility to someone with authority who “will actually take 
responsibility for it, for their division to handle the problem.” (D4).  
Another respondent (F6) spoke again about the value of leadership involvement to 
maintain focus on the after-action process. The respondent said:  
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So at the highest level, it’s important to help your leader understand what is 
gained by going through the after-action process, how it is important, and 
give the weight of their position to the process. That makes it run faster 
because after a disaster, everybody just wants to return to their old life. (F6) 
3. Communication Failures Limit Reporting of Findings  
Even a well-documented and supported IP can face challenges if it is not 
communicated back to the exercise participants. Each interviewee was asked how their 
after-action document and IP gets communicated. Several interviewees (A1, B2, and C3) 
spoke of circulating the draft report back to subject matter experts at participating agencies. 
Others (D4, E5, and F6) said the document gets sent electronically to key partners in 
participating agencies. One interviewee, (D4), said, “it will go back via email chain to some 
of the key players who then cascade it down as needed.” However, one respondent pointed 
out the potential flaw with this approach:  
We really do rely heavily on those individuals from the agencies to pass the 
information along. And I don’t have any real data to point to how well that 
gets disseminated or how consistent that is across the departments or even 
different agencies (C3) 
When asked about communicating the after-action documents back to participants, 
one interviewee remarked, “There are so few written after-action reports that are made 
even—not even public, but even shared amongst peers. It’s really sad” (F6).  
SOLUTION: Exercise professionals communicate after-action findings and 
improvement-plan items more broadly. 
One interviewee (B2) spoke about his innovative solution to the challenge of 
communicating after-action findings back to participants. The interviewee explained:  
So we—and it’s a lunch. We meet for lunch and we do a luncheon. We go 
around the room with all our stakeholders, and we talk about successes and 
failures and improvements (B2). 
By offering a luncheon opportunity to his exercise participants a few weeks after 
the exercise, B2 is able to communicate the successes and areas of improvement to a wider 
audience than would read an emailed document. It becomes a social time, with interactive 
discussions and participant buy-in.  
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Acknowledging that exercises identify gaps and potential “dirty laundry” (F6), 
holding people accountable for changes and improvements, and sharing after-action 
documents within and between agencies are challenges exercise professionals face when 
they try to implement IPs after exercises. Exercise professionals with successful after-






The idea of using corporate change management theories in the world of emergency 
management is not as strange as it first appears. Many change management concepts 
overlap HSEEP concepts. Adding successful change management strategies to a HSEEP 
IP can help move a jurisdiction beyond just identifying the same gaps repeatedly, and 
actually help make strides towards strengthening a jurisdiction’s capabilities.  
Table 16 brings together successful change management strategies compiled from 
the literature, findings from surveying four different levels of agency authority, and the 
experiences of exercise professionals expressed in interviews. The table shows the 
relationship between generalized change management steps, existing strengths of the 
HSEEP process that promote change, and remaining areas for improvement or barriers that 




Table 16. Change Step, HSEEP Process Strength, and HSEEP Area for Improvement or Barrier 
General Change Step—
Compiled from Change 
Management Strategies 
 
HSEEP Process Strength HSEEP Area for Improvement or Barrier 
(1) Realize Change is 
Needed—collect 
information to understand 
the problem from as many 
stakeholders as possible 
in a group setting101 
HSEEP after-action events begin with a 
hotwash where areas for improvement 
(change) are identified 
 
Hotwash—facilitated discussion held 
immediately after an exercise for players to 
capture feedback about issues, concerns and 
propose improvements102 
 
“We go around the room with all our 
stakeholders, and we talk about successes 
and failures and improvements” (B2) 
A hotwash is a start, but exercise professionals 
must go beyond simple discussions and include 
feedback from experienced, unbiased evaluators 
  
—Using only self-assessments from a hotwash 
can be unreliable, unless findings are correlated 
with qualified evaluator assessments103  
 
“Sometimes I feel like they get, the after-action 
reports and the feedback that we’ll receive, gets 
kind of sterilized”(C3) 
 
“Group settings can tend to be two or three 
people who dominate the conversation” (F6) 
(2) Choose Members for 
Change Committee—
choose staff to guide and 
oversee change process104 
The nature of employees in the preparedness 
field is an advantage 
 
Exercise professionals interviewed noted 
difficulty finding change committee members 
because interest wanes after an exercise is 
completed (C3) and frustration at the lack of 
 
101 Stouten, Rousseau, and De Cremer, “Successful Organization Change,” 757. 
102 Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) Glossary–6. 
103 Elena Savoia et al., “Assessing Public Health Capabilities during Emergency Preparedness Tabletop Exercises: Reliability and Validity of a Measurement Tool,” 
Public Health Reports 124, no. 1 (February 2009): 144, https://doi.org/10.1177/003335490912400117. 




Compiled from Change 
Management Strategies 
 
HSEEP Process Strength HSEEP Area for Improvement or Barrier 
Nature of Staff—staff in the homeland 
security, emergency management, 
healthcare, and first responder fields are 
“volunteers” by nature; they want to make 
their communities better, safer, and more 
resilient and are more likely to volunteer to 
help foster changes within their agencies 
 
“The emergency management structure in 
any organization is who the true champions 
are” (F6) 
improvement tracking mechanisms (A1), causing 
some change committee members to be chosen 
simply because they showed up (D4) 
—Personnel shortages can limit or prohibit after-
action events and changes105 
 
 “People who act as champions maybe [do it] just 
for a while, and then it doesn’t always last. Other 
things take priority after a while, and then I 
wouldn’t say the follow-through is there” (D4)  
(3) Create Change 
Plan—determine strategic 
actions, outline steps 
needed, and determine 
compelling motivation to 
act106 
HSEEP after-action events are documented 
in an After-Action Report/Improvement Plan 
 
AAR/IP—summarizes key evaluation 
information, objectives, core capabilities, 
strengths, and areas for improvement; 
specifies corrective actions, assigns 
responsibilities, and due dates107  
 
 “It’s not really worth doing an exercise 
unless you are able to document some 
findings and areas for improvement” (A1) 
Researchers of after-action documents note 
writing AARs give an agency the illusion of 
learning, unless action consolidates the lesson108 
 
HSEEP is of limited help after an exercise - less 
than 10% of HSEEP contains information about 
data analysis, creating the After-Action Report 
and the Improvement Plan combined  
 
 “We shouldn’t be investing our resources in 
training and exercises unless we make the effort 
to improve our lessons-learned processes. ‘If you 
 
105 Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, FEMA’s Progress in Implementing the Remedial Action Management Program, 5. 
106 Stouten, Rousseau, and De Cremer, “Successful Organization Change,” 758–60. 
107 Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP), Glossary–1, Glossary–6. 




Compiled from Change 
Management Strategies 
 
HSEEP Process Strength HSEEP Area for Improvement or Barrier 
don’t get the lessons right you chase hollow 
solutions and throw money away without actually 
solving problems’”109 
 
 “Lessons reporting processes are, on the whole, 
ad hoc. There is no universally accepted 




communicate the planned 
changes as far, as often, 
and through as many 
channels as possible111 
HSEEP recommends conducting an After-
Action Meeting (AAM) to showcase the 
AAR to leadership and begin communicating 
the areas for improvements (changes) 
identified 
 
After-Action Meeting—interactive meeting 
allowing leadership and exercise planners an 
opportunity to discuss and validate exercise 
findings112 
 
—Mid- and Senior-level managers reported 
seeing AARs 66.7% and 58.3%, respectively, 
Researchers noted there can be political 
consequences to releasing an after-action 
document if it identifies agency flaws or policy 
failures113 
 
—Less than half (38.6%) of front-line staff 
surveyed reported being provided a chance to 
read the after-action documentation, even less 
(24.6%) reported seeing an Improvement Plan  
 
 “A lot of times, we’ll circulate it [AAR] to all of 
the participants or at least kind of the key 
participants from specific agencies” (A1) 
 
109 Donahue and Tuohy, 17. 
110 Donahue and Tuohy, 12. 
111 Stouten, Rousseau, and De Cremer, “Successful Organization Change,” 760–61. 
112 Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP), Glossary–1. 




Compiled from Change 
Management Strategies 
 
HSEEP Process Strength HSEEP Area for Improvement or Barrier 
and IPs 66.7% and 50.0% of the time (survey 
data) 
 “It [AAR] will go back via email chain to some 
of the key players who then cascade it down as 
needed” (D4) 
 “We really rely heavily on those individuals 
from the agencies to pass the information along” 
(C3) 
(5) Act on Change 
Plan—empower 
employees, remove 
obstacles, and implement 
changes to processes114 
Successful after-action reviews actually put 
plans into practice115  
 
HSEEP’s progressive approach of using a 
common set of priorities and objectives, over 
a series of exercises increasing in complexity 
to demonstrate improvement over time helps 
an agency put its change plan into action116 
 
“A true AAR practice pays attention to future 
action, not just reflection on what happened 
to date”117 
Researchers of after-action processes note 
conducting a preparedness exercise does not 
equate to taking action to improve deficient 
processes118 
 
—Agencies happy with fantasy document AARs 
“will resist serious lesson-learning processes by 
either resisting the creation of such investigations 
[into causes of gaps], or will, once the 
investigation is complete, deny the lessons on 
cost, feasibility, or other grounds, or will simply 
ignore them”119 
 
114 Stouten, Rousseau, and De Cremer, “Successful Organization Change,” 763. 
115 Marilyn Darling and Charles S. Parry, “After-Action Reviews: Linking Reflection and Planning in a Learning Practice,” Reflections 3, no. 2 (2001): 65. 
116 Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP), 1–1. 
117 Darling and Parry, “After-Action Reviews: Linking Reflection and Planning in a Learning Practice,” 65. 
118 Ashley A. Bowen, “Are We Really Ready? The Need for National Emergency Preparedness Standards and the Creation of the Cycle of Emergency Planning,” 
Politics & Policy 36, no. 5 (October 2008): 847, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2008.00137.x. 




Compiled from Change 
Management Strategies 
 
HSEEP Process Strength HSEEP Area for Improvement or Barrier 
 “Usually [the AAR] it’s something that we try to 
use to guide improvement planning, but it’s not 
always taken—it—I wouldn’t say it’s not 
accepted because I feel like the stakeholders who 
are involved in the exercise believe in the 
improvements that are identified and the 
strengths that are identified, but I feel like 
sometimes it goes by the wayside of actually 
getting incorporated. We can only do so much in 
our office” (C3)  
 
 “We occasionally mark some of these corrective 
actions [items] as what we call ‘inactive’, which 
basically meant we looked at, we explored it. It’s 
probably not gonna happen for a various 
reasons… there’s not really a path forward to 
complete it” (A1) 
(6) Monitor Changes—
track changes over time to 
sustain interest and 
attention, and to measure 
progress120 
HSEEP after-action events are tracked in an 
Improvement Plan (IP)  
 
IP and Tracking—identify specific steps to 
correct gaps, assign individuals responsible 
for each item, and track progress against 
target dates121 
Researchers of after-action events note there is a 
lack of standardized processes for reporting and 
tracking lessons learned and planned updates122  
 
—Organizations have “worked to innovate and 
improve their systems, but most have not 
 
120 Stouten, Rousseau, and De Cremer, “Successful Organization Change,” 766. 
121 Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP), Glossary–6. 




Compiled from Change 
Management Strategies 
 
HSEEP Process Strength HSEEP Area for Improvement or Barrier 
“We … [tie] performance measure with city 
government that we have a certain 
percentage of our corrective actions 
completed within six months” (A1) 
systematically analyzed why innovations do or do 
not work”123 
“It required a lot of manual exporting and people 
to go in and look at [the IP tracking program]. 
And that wasn’t always effective” (A1) 
(7) Involve 
Leadership—engage and 
gather support from 
leadership; coach change 
in others; shows buy-in 
and belief in change124 
HSEEP supports the inclusion of senior 
leaders and elected officials from the 
beginning of the exercise planning process 
 
Leadership Buy-in—“early and frequent 
engagement of elected and appointed 
officials is the key to success”125 
 
 “We kind of had our leadership actually 
planning the exercise” (D4) 
Researchers of after-action events have noted 
leadership may focus on “doing something” to be 
seen doing something, rather than to actually 
accomplish the changes required to improve126  
 
—Less than half (41.7%) of senior-level 
managers surveyed reported seeing policy 
changes addressing gaps identified by 
preparedness exercises 
 
 “We will review the finalized after-action report 
with —kind of at a high level with them [City 
Manager and Deputy City Manager] of just went 
well, what are the big things to be improved and 
what the—kind of the plan is to do that. But 




123 Rachael N. Piltch-Loeb et al., “A Peer Assessment Approach for Learning from Public Health Emergencies,” Public Health Reports 129 (Supplement 2014): 29. 
124 Stouten, Rousseau, and De Cremer, 758–63. 
125 Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP), 1–1. 
126 Birkland, “Disasters, Lessons Learned, and Fantasy Documents,” 146–48. 
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Change management strategies attempt to overcome the same challenges faced by 
preparedness stakeholders. Looking at the literature of change management, HSEEP users 
can find new methods to help increase the likelihood of successfully changing their 
organization. 
• Realize a change is needed. Before any organization can change, a belief 
that change is needed must first exist.127 HSEEP is a guide to exercise 
creation and one of its stated goals is the identification of areas for 
improvement. HSEEP’s identification of change process begins with a 
hotwash, a facilitated discussion during which all participants are free to 
speak about what they feel went well in the exercise and what needs 
improvement, or change. The challenge exercise evaluation literature 
noted is the unreliability of using only self-assessments, and instead 
recommends a combination of self-identification and qualified evaluator 
assessments.  
• A change committee must be formed to guide the process, once the need 
for change is identified. Change management literature notes the most 
successful committee members are those who volunteer to help because 
they feel strongly in favor of the proposed change.128 Exercise 
professionals interviewed noted the people who worked on their exercise 
planning teams were the ones felt strongly about the need for 
improvement (C3). These same interviewees also noted the difficulty the 
agency champions had in keeping change momentum going as time went 
on. 
• A change plan must be created, once the need for change is identified and 
a change committee is formed. HSEEP addresses this idea directly by 
recommending an AAR/IP. Literature looking at the history of after-action 
 
127 Stouten, Rousseau, and Cremer, “Successful Organization Change,” 757. 
128 Kotter, “Accelerate!,” 49. 
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reviews and reports noted failures of instruction on how to write or 
implement an AAR/IP.129 
• The change plan must be communicated to relevant stakeholders for the 
changes to occur.130 The HSEEP process includes a suggestion for an 
after-action meeting (AAM), a participatory meeting to review and 
communicate suggested changes.131 However, more than half (51.7%) of 
all survey respondents reported not seeing or not knowing if they saw an 
AAR following the exercise in which they participated. Even more survey 
respondents (62.7%) responded they had not seen or did not know if they 
saw an IP for the exercise in which they participated. Chapter IV looks at 
this finding in more detail, and includes break outs by authority level 
within organizations. 
• The change plan must be acted on by the agency. HSEEP suggests making 
an IP to lay out the required corrective actions to take.132 However, the 
literature around after-action documents suggests they are “fantasy 
documents;” agencies create them, but fail to implement the corrective 
actions suggested.133 
• The proposed changes must be monitored for task completion to help 
reinforce the change process.134 HSEEP promotes using an IP to identify 
action steps and assign specific individuals responsibility for their 
completion.135 However, if an agency is content to just create a change 
 
129 Donahue and Tuohy, “Lessons We Don’t Learn,” 9. 
130 Stouten, Rousseau, and De Cremer, “Successful Organization Change,” 754. 
131 Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP), 
6–1. 
132 Department of Homeland Security, 6–1. 
133 Birkland, “Disasters, Lessons Learned, and Fantasy Documents,” 146–56. 
134 Stouten, Rousseau, and De Cremer, “Successful Organization Change,” 755. 




plan, changes will not be incorporated into behavior. Interviews with 
exercise professionals noted the difficulty of tracking corrective action 
steps because no standardized method is available (A1). 
• Leadership must be involved in promoting the change. Exercise 
professionals spoke about the value of leadership involvement (D4, F6). 
Yet, nearly half (41.7%) of senior-level leaders reported not seeing or not 
knowing if they saw an AAR for the exercise in which they participated. 
In addition, a fully half of senior leadership surveyed reported not seeing 
or not knowing if they saw an IP following a preparedness exercise. 
FEMA’s HSEEP templates and training course provide exercise professionals a 
solid foundation for creating preparedness exercises. However, HSEEP lacks guidance on 
the creation, implementation, and tracking of AARs and IPs. Interviews with exercise 
professionals provided personal stories and served as examples of the change management 
problems identified by the scholarly literature. A survey sampling preparedness 
stakeholders confirmed the assertions found in the scholarly literature of the problems with 
current after-action documentation methods. Change management strategies can provide 
help for preparedness stakeholders attempting to move beyond just identifying gaps to 
actually improving their agencies.  
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VII. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Research into the field of preparedness exercises has come a long way in the 
decades since journal writers believed little existed to demonstrate the value of exercises.136 
FEMA’s HSEEP offers a creation framework for exercise professionals. However, 
preparedness professionals must incorporate exercise findings into after-action events and 
documents to drive policy and training changes.137 The purpose of this thesis was to arrive 
at a better understanding of the different after-action experiences among four employee 
authority levels in government, healthcare, and first responder agencies. This thesis also 
looked for common factors in agencies with successful after-action events and innovative 
solutions to the barriers still faced. 
Statistical analysis was used on survey data and identified differences in after-
action experiences of exercise participants. Survey respondents were grouped into 
categories by the authority level they possessed within their agency, and front-line and 
first-level managers were divided from mid- and senior-level managers.  
Semi-structured interviews were conducted to understand after-action events from 
the perspective of the exercise professionals who create them. Exercise professionals with 
successful after-action events were interviewed to look for common factors leading to 
success and innovative solutions to the remaining barriers. The following summary speaks 
to each research question posed in this thesis.  
A. SUMMARY 
This thesis was designed to answer four research questions. A summary of the 
findings for each question follows: 
• Do preparedness exercises result in visible policy, training, or behavior 
changes seen by front-line employees and first-level managers? 
 
136 Danny M. Peterson and Ronald W. Perry, “The Impacts of Disaster Exercises on Participants,” 
Disaster Prevention and Management 8, no. 4 (1999): 241.  
137 Mastaglio et al., Current Practice and Theoretical Foundations, 23. 
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Survey data showed more front-line employees and first-level managers reported 
they did not see or were not sure if they saw policy changes addressing gaps identified by 
preparedness exercises. The majority of those same employees also reported they did not 
see or were not sure if they saw any training changes because of preparedness exercises. A 
majority of front-line employees and first-level managers did report personally changing 
their behavior as a result of gaps identified by preparedness exercises.  
• Do after-action event experiences of upper-level management differ from 
front-line employees and first-level managers? 
The survey data showed that after-action experiences differed by authority level 
across preparedness agencies. Mid- and senior-level managers saw more policy and 
training changes addressing gaps identified by preparedness exercises than front-line staff 
or first-level managers. All authority levels reported personally changing behavior due to 
gaps identified by preparedness exercises. A higher percentage of mid- and senior-level 
managers reported changing their behavior than employees with lower authority levels. 
More upper-level management stated they were provided opportunities to read IPs than 
employees with lower authority levels.  
• In agencies with successful after-action events, what factors account for 
their success? 
Interviewing exercise professionals with successful after-action events revealed 
three common themes. Interviewees spoke of the need for leadership support for the 
difficult work of making agency changes and improvements after a preparedness exercise. 
A second common factor was the role of real world events, either positive, planned events 
or negative, emergency situations. Exercise creators used real world events to drive 
changes and gain commitments to improve plans and training within their organizations. 
Finally, exercise professionals noted the importance of whole community and interagency 




• What innovative solutions can help overcome the remaining challenges 
hindering successful after-action processes? 
Interviews with exercise professionals determined similar barriers remain across 
jurisdictions. The interview subjects noted three, consistent barriers: (1) political pressure 
to either sanitize or not release after-action documents, (2) losing focus on the improvement 
plan once the exercise concludes, and (3) after-action documents not disseminated equally 
to all levels within an organization.  
Interview subjects also reported innovative solutions to work around the barriers 
they still face. Building trust helped prevent sanitizing after-action documents. Identifying 
agency employees passionate about specific improvement items made them ideal 
champions to guide their task to completion. Hosting a luncheon to gathering exercise 
participants and leadership back together after an exercise provided an opportunity to 
widely communicate after-action findings and planned improvement strategies.  
B. CONCLUSIONS 
Corporate change management theories outline processes that can increase the 
likelihood of successful organizational change. Emergency management and first 
responder agencies struggle to communicate capability gaps and improvement plans to 
different authority levels within their organizations. HSEEP lacks usable guidance for 
exercise professionals on how to document and implement needed changes.  
Three factors increase the likely success of changing an organization after an 
exercise: engaged leadership, relating training and exercises to real world incidents, and 
involving the whole community. However, barriers to success still exist that include 
politics, waning attention post-exercise, and communication failures limiting 
dissemination of after-action documents. However, using innovative work-arounds, such 
as building trust with exercise participants and leaders, identifying improvement item 
champions, and finding novel ways to communicate after-action findings to large numbers 
of stakeholders can help exercise professionals overcome the challenges still faced.  
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A cohesive change management strategy can help preparedness agencies improve 
after-action events by successfully managing organizational changes. The following 
section outlines ways preparedness agencies could include corporate change management 
strategies to improve after-action events. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Preparedness exercises play a major part in ensuring the nation is ready for any 
natural, accidental, or malicious event.138 To increase the nation’s preparedness, agencies 
must not only conduct exercises, but also learn from them. Information learned from 
exercises is perishable; retaining it is a matter of capturing and codifying it for future 
discussion, training, or policy changes.139 A clear plan to manage information collection 
and organizational changes can improve after-action event outcomes and increase 
capabilities within a preparedness organization. These recommendations offer strategies to 
increase successful after-action events. 
1. Organizational Changes Must Be Clearly Identified to All Authority 
Levels 
Preparedness agencies update policies and training programs to address gaps 
identified by exercises and real-world events. However, policy changes and training roll-
outs must be communicated to all authority levels within an organization frequently and 
include why changes are occurring. Consistently communicating the importance of the 
organizational change signals to employees the value and seriousness with which the 
organization views the need for improvement.  
2. Organizations Must Include Employees of All Authority Levels in 
After-Action Events  
Preparedness agencies do not intend to silo employees and limit communication. 
But if only management is privy to after-action discussions and improvement planning, 
 
138 Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP), 
Intro–1. 
139 Peter T. Gaynor, “Special Event Planning for the Emergency Manager,” Journal of Business 
Continuity & Emergency Planning 4, no. 1 (November 2009): 14–21. 
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front-line employees are left out. Including employees of all authority levels helps drive 
change. Employees with enthusiasm champion improvement plan items they feel 
passionately about, regardless of their authority level.  
3. Leverage Leadership, Whole Community Support, and Trust for 
Successful After-Action Events 
Successful change management strategies encourage leaders to drive change 
visibly. Incorporating leadership influence helps increase the successful completion of 
improvement plan items. Interagency cooperation and community partnerships help by 
distributing work and cost among many stakeholders when improvement plan items are 
big or costly. Building trust plays an important role in both receiving honest feedback from 
exercise participants and working with leadership to approve honest documents for 
dissemination.  
4. Exercise Professionals Must Disseminate After-Action Documents to 
Wider Audiences 
Exercise professionals need to reach broader audiences with after-action 
documents. Expanding distribution beyond single points of contact within agencies 
provides more exercise participants an opportunity to learn the exercise findings.  
Barriers to successful after-action processes exist. Change management strategies 
can help overcome them and improve performance outcomes and preparedness 
capabilities.  
D. FUTURE RESEARCH 
More research into successful after-action events will help exercise professionals 
manage organizational change. An examination of employee motivation could help 
exercise professionals find more successful improvement plan strategies. An investigation 
into possible alternatives could provide preparedness agencies an option other than HSEEP 
for after-action documentation and improvement planning.  
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APPENDIX A 
Pre-Survey Question: Do you consent to be interviewed? Click here for complete consent 
information. 
a) I consent
b) I do not consent
If “a,” go to 1. If “b” go to Thank You screen
1) Has your employer or agency conducted or been part of a preparedness exercise
in the last 2 years?
Exercise types might include:
Tabletop Exercise (TTX) where participants discussed a scenario and what they
would do (examples include: the 2018 PIP conference “Under Fire” 4-hour
tabletop exercise)
Functional Exercise (FE) – where participants coordinate between various
agencies in coordination centers (EOCs). Play is limited to talking, phone calls,
entry into online programs. No “boots on the ground” movement.
Full-Scale Exercise (FSE) – multi-agency, multi-jurisdictional involving “boots
on the ground” where participants actually move equipment and perform activities
(examples include: 2017 Vigilant Guard; 2018 WIPPTREX)
a. Yes / No / I Don’t Know
If YES, go to 2. If NO go to 12. If I Don’t Know, go to 12 
2) Did you participate in the preparedness exercise?
a. Yes / No / I Don’t Know
If YES, go to 3. If NO go to 6. If I Don’t Know, go to 6 
3) What was your role? Check all that apply if you have had more than one role
a. Player – Active participant who responds to the exercise,
b. Controller / Evaluator – Manage or evaluate the exercise, direct the pace
and monitor the timeline. Measure and assess performance
c. Exercise planner – Creators of the exercise. Determine scope, objectives,
scenario
d. Observer –View exercise but do not participate, provide input, or evaluate
e. Sim Cell player – Exercise control staff who simulate roles of non-
playing agencies
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All answers go to 4 
4) Did you provide any feedback after the exercise?
Feedback types might include:
Hotwash – In person, immediately after the exercise; “say a positive/ something
that needs improvement” verbal discussion usually less than 30 minutes
Paper Feedback Survey – may be immediately after the exercise or sent shortly
after
Online Feedback Survey – may be immediately after the exercise or sent shortly
after
After-Action Conference or Meeting – Formal event, usually about 30 days
after exercise, involves leadership
a. Yes / No / I Don’t Know
If YES, go to 5. If NO or I Don’t Know go to 6. 
5) Which type of feedback did you provide? Check all that apply
a. Hotwash
b. Paper Feedback survey
c. Online Feedback survey
d. Conference or Meeting
All answers go to 6 
6) After the preparedness exercise(s) did your agency provided you an opportunity
to read after-action documents? The document might be in the form of an After-
Action Report (AAR), a report that captures observations and recommendations
based on the exercise objectives, a Lessons Learned document, or new policy
related to exercise findings.
a. Yes / No / I Don’t Know
If YES, go to 7. If NO or I Don’t Know go to 8. 
7) If you provided feedback after the preparedness exercise, did you feel your
feedback was incorporated into the After-Action Report (AAR) or after-action
document?
a. Yes / No / I Don’t Know / I didn’t provide feedback
All answers go to 8 
8) After the preparedness exercise(s) did your agency provided you an opportunity
to read the Improvement Plan (IP), a document that identifies specific corrective
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action steps and assigns them to responsible parties with an established target date 
for completion? 
 
a. Yes / No / I Don’t Know 
If YES, go to 9. If NO or I Don’t Know 10 
 
9) If you provided feedback after the exercise, did you feel your feedback was 
incorporated into the Improvement Plan (IP)? 
a. Yes / No / I Don’t Know / I didn’t provide feedback 
All answers go to 10 
 
10) Have you seen a policy change at your agency addressing gaps identified by the 
preparedness exercise(s)? 
a. Yes / No / I Don’t Know 
All answers go to 11 
 
11) Have you experienced any training changes at your agency addressing gaps 
identified by the preparedness exercise(s)? 
a. Yes / No / I Don’t Know 
 
All answers go to 12 
 
12) Have you personally changed any behavior as a result of a gap identified by the 
preparedness exercise? 
a. Yes / No / I Don’t Know  
All answers go to 13 
 
13) Type of employer: 
a. Government (any level Federal; State; County; Local; Tribal – not law 
enforcement) 
b. Healthcare provider 
c. Emergency management 
d. Fire service 
e. Emergency Medical Service 
f. Law Enforcement 
g. Other 
All answers go to 14 
14) Are you a:  
a. Front-line employee (not supervisor or manager) 
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b. First line supervisor (report to a manager and front-line employees report
to you)
c. Middle level manager (supervisors or lower management report to you)
d. Senior level manager (middle managers report to you)
All answers go to Thank You Screen 
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APPENDIX B 
Recruit Email for Survey (First Email)
Good Morning, 
You are invited to participate in an anonymous research survey for a master’s thesis about 
after-action events following a preparedness exercise.  
The survey is designed to take 3-5 minutes, and consists of a maximum of 15 questions. 
Your participation is voluntary. If you choose to participate, you may 
withdraw at any time. The information obtained during this study will be 
kept confidential, you will not be asked for your name or email. You will 
not benefit directly from this research nor be placed at risk of any adverse 
actions as a result of your responses. Additional questions about your 
rights as a research subject or any other concerns may be addressed to the 
Navy Postgraduate School IRB Chair, Dr. Larry Shattuck, 831-656-2473, 
lgshattu@nps.edu or to the Principle Investigator, Dr. Gail Fann Thomas 
831.656.2767. 
Please click the link to begin this short survey. Thank you for your participation! 
Cynthia Holmes 
Training and Exercise Unit Manager 
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APPENDIX C 
Recruit Email for Survey (Second/Final Email)
Good Morning / Afternoon, 
About a week ago you received an email asking for your participation in an anonymous, 
online survey. If you have completed the survey, thank you! If not, it’s not too late! 
This survey provides research for a master’s thesis about after-action events following a 
preparedness exercise. If you haven’t participated in an exercise, please still take the 
survey, as that information is valuable too! 
The survey is designed to only take 3-5 minutes, and consists of a maximum of 15 
questions.  
Your participation is voluntary. If you choose to participate, you may 
withdraw at any time. The information obtained during this study will be 
kept confidential, you will not be asked for your name or email. You will 
not benefit directly from this research nor be placed at risk of any adverse 
actions as a result of your responses. Additional questions about your 
rights as a research subject or any other concerns may be addressed to the 
Navy Postgraduate School IRB Chair, Dr. Larry Shattuck, 831-656-2473, 
lgshattu@nps.edu or to the Principle Investigator, Dr. Gail Fann Thomas 
831.656.2767. 
Please click the link to begin this short survey. Thank you for your participation! 
Cynthia Holmes 
Training and Exercise Unit Manager 
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APPENDIX D 
Recruit Script for Interview (First Email)
Good Morning / Afternoon, 
My name is Cynthia Holmes, and I am a graduate student at the Naval Postgraduate School. 
Thank you for your interest in potentially participating in research about successful after-
action events, following a preparedness exercise. The interview will take 45-60 minutes. 
Your participation is voluntary. If you choose to participate, you may 
withdraw at any time. You may also refuse to answer any question, in 
whole or in part. The information obtained during this study will be kept 
confidential. This research will take place over a recorded phone 
interview, and transcribed. You will not benefit directly from this research 
nor be placed at risk of any adverse actions as a result of your responses. 
Additional questions about your rights as a research subject or any other 
concerns may be addressed to the Navy Postgraduate School IRB Chair, 
Dr. Larry Shattuck, 831-656-2473, lgshattu@nps.edu or to the Principle 
Investigator, Dr. Gail Fann Thomas 831.656.2767. 
If you choose to participate, you will be emailed the provided Consent Form for your 
records, and asked to provide a verbal consent at the beginning of the interview. 
Thank you for your consideration! 
Cynthia Holmes 
Training and Exercise Unit Manager 
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APPENDIX E 
Recruit Script for Interview (Second/Last Email) 
Good Morning / Afternoon, 
My name is Cynthia Holmes, and a graduate student at the Naval Postgraduate School. I 
am following up on an initial email request sent about a week ago. 
You are being asked to participate in research for a master’s thesis about successful after-
action events, following a preparedness exercise. This survey is expected to take between 
45-60 minutes. 
Your participation is voluntary. If you choose to participate, you may 
withdraw at any time. You may also refuse to answer any question, in 
whole or in part. The information obtained during this study will be kept 
confidential. This research will take place over a recorded phone 
interview, and transcribed. You will not benefit directly from this research 
nor be placed at risk of any adverse actions as a result of your responses. 
Additional questions about your rights as a research subject or any other 
concerns may be addressed to the Navy Postgraduate School IRB Chair, 
Dr. Larry Shattuck, 831-656-2473, lgshattu@nps.edu or to the Principle 
Investigator, Dr. Gail Fann Thomas 831.656.2767. 
If you choose to participate, you will be emailed the provided Consent Form for your 
records, and asked to provide a verbal consent at the beginning of the interview. 
Thank you for your consideration! 
Cynthia Holmes 
Training and Exercise Unit Manager 
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APPENDIX F 
Do you consent to be interviewed? 
1) What does your process look like after an exercise concludes?
Possible Prompts: 
a. What after-action events take place, and when?
b. Who is involved, and how are they chosen, and what do they contribute?
c. Who facilitates the process and how are they chosen?
d. How are the after-action events documented?
e. What is the role of the after-action events in your agency?
f. Who is the champion of the after-action event(s)?
g. What happens once the after-action event(s) occur?
h. Is there a feedback loop (i.e. participant feedback collected? How is it
used?)
i. How are the after-action events or documents communicated?
j. How do you know when your after-action event(s) are successful?
2) What factors do you think account for your successful after-action events?
Possible Prompts: 
a. What role does Leadership play?
b. Does your agency have contract support?
c. Does your agency have a dedicated IP tracker?
d. How does your agency communicate its after-action findings and intended
changes?
e. What is the typical time frame for your after-action events?
3) What was the genesis of your current, successful after-action process?
Possible Prompts: 
a. Did your agency study other successful agencies?
b. Did your agency study change management theory?
c. Study other best practices?
d. New leadership?
4) Can you tell me a little about your experience with facilitating preparedness
exercises and their after-action events?
Possible Prompts: 
a. What is your current title?
b. How long have you been involved with exercises?
c. In your current position, are preparedness exercise creation and conduct
your primary function?
d. What training (either formal or informal) have you received in terms of
exercise design, creation, facilitation, and reporting?
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